



June Omnibus Survey | 1<sup>st</sup> Release | 1<sup>st</sup> July 2021

# Building Bridges Initiative (BBI) Public Opinion Poll Results

## Knowledge, Perceptions and Support Levels

#KenyanViewsOnBBI

**In reporting the findings of this Release it is important to note that all interviews were completed the day before the Court of Appeal began to hear the case challenging the judgment of the High Court of May 4 that found the entire BBI process intended to lead to a national referendum to approve or reject the proposals contained in the Constitution of Kenya Amendment bill of 2021 was unconstitutional and cannot take place, pending appeal.**

**Executive Summary**

**Opening Comment and Summary Findings**

**Main Findings**

**Conclusions**

**Methodology and Demographics**



# Opening Comment and Summary Findings




- ❑ All the findings included in this 1<sup>st</sup> Release are taken from the national survey TIFA Research conducted between June 24<sup>th</sup> and June 28<sup>th</sup> 2021. The survey covered a variety of important public issues, that of the now uncertain BBI referendum being among them.
- ❑ Since TIFA's last such survey in December, 2020, a number of important and indeed dramatic events have occurred relating to this issue, in particular, the High Court's unanimous judgment declaring the entire process null and void, based on 17 actions and omissions considered to be unconstitutional or illegal. Currently, the first stage of a possible two-stage appeal process is underway, at the Court of Appeal. While the hearing is set to conclude on July 2, the judgment may likely not be forthcoming for another few weeks.
- ❑ At the same time, the first half of 2021 has witnessed considerable political activity, notwithstanding the public health guidelines (and legal restrictions) put in place to control the still virulent Covid-19 pandemic. Such activity has included a number of by-elections, public rallies, the commissioning of major government projects, and funerals of prominent leaders (and of their family members), all of which have served to focus attention on next year's general election (in August).

# BBI Referendum: Familiarity and Constitutional Changes



How much is known about the proposed BBI reforms




## Voting Intention in BBI Referendum

Only 50% of Kenyans have decided how they will vote for the BBI. Undecided/will not vote/not sure constitute 50% of Kenyans



December 2020	June 2021
<input type="checkbox"/> 29% would vote YES	<input type="checkbox"/> 19% would vote YES
<input type="checkbox"/> 32% would vote NO	<input type="checkbox"/> 31% would vote NO
<input type="checkbox"/> 26% would NOT VOTE AT ALL	<input type="checkbox"/> 18% would NOT VOTE AT ALL
<input type="checkbox"/> 16% NOT SURE/NO OPINION	<input type="checkbox"/> 25% are undecided
	<input type="checkbox"/> 7% NOT SURE/NO OPINION

# BBI Referendum: Current Voting Intentions



n=All respondents

## Top reasons for intending to vote "YES"

- 27% increased budgetary allocation to counties
- 11% creation of the Ward Development Fund
- 8% creation of 70 new parliamentary constituencies
- 7% creation of position of PM and two DPMs
- 7% implementation of 2/3 gender rule by creating new constituencies
- 7% strengthened Constituency Development Fund
- 5% enhanced national cohesion/unity

n=intend to vote YES

## Top reasons for intending to vote "NO"

- 10% increased budgetary allocation to counties
- 8% Use of government resources to promote BBI
- 8% creating of PM and two DPM positions
- 7% creation of 70 new parliamentary constituencies
- 6% satisfied with the current Constitution
- 4% creation of the position of leader of the official opposition

n=intend to vote NO

# BBI Intended Voting by Political Party Affiliation



Voting intention  
in the BBI  
referendum



**ODM Supporters**

- 59% would vote **YES**
- 13% would vote **NO**
- 12% **undecided whether to vote YES/NO**
- 7% would not vote all
- 7% undecided whether to vote at all
- 1% **NOT SURE/NO OPINION**

*n=all ODM supporters*

**JUBILEEE Supporters**

- 25% would vote **YES**
- 31% would vote **NO**
- 11% undecided whether to vote **YES/NO**
- 16% would **NOT VOTE AT ALL**
- 13% undecided whether to vote at all
- 5% **NOT SURE/NO OPINION**

*n=all Jubilee supporters*


**UDA Supporters**

- 9% would vote **YES**
- 57% would vote **NO**
- 6% undecided whether to vote **YES/NO**
- 19% would **NOT VOTE AT ALL**
- 7% undecided whether to vote at all
- 2% **NOT SURE/NO OPINION**

*n=all UDA supporters*

# Perceived Motivations for the BBI

Motivations for the BBI Referendum



## General views about the motivations for BBI

- ❑ **43%** an effort by certain politicians to influence the 2022 presidential election
- ❑ **25%** an effort by both politicians and citizens to solve the situation in the country
- ❑ **15%** effort by citizens to make the Constitution more effective in addressing their own problems

Q. "Regarding the BBI campaign to change the Constitution, which of the following is closest to your own view?" **OPTIONS READ OUT**



## Uhuru's motivation to support BBI

- ❑ **29%** to influence/control the election for the next president
- ❑ **14%** to encourage/build national unity
- ❑ **8%** try and make the next president powerful
- ❑ **4%** to have a better/good legacy before he retires

Q. "What do you think is the main reason that President Uhuru supports the BBI amendment bill?"



## Raila's motivation to support BBI

- ❑ **50%** to increase his chances of being the next president
- ❑ **13%** to encourage/build national unity
- ❑ **3%** to fix/correct certain errors in the 2010 Constitution

Q. "What do you think is the main reason that Raila supports the BBI amendment bill?"




# Constitutional Change and the BBI Referendum: Section One – Main Findings

- Support for Any Constitutional Changes/Main Reason Why Those Who Don't Support Any Changes
- Reported Participation in BBI Process
- Perceived Likelihood of Having a BBI Referendum Before the 2022 Election
- Perceived Main Reason Why the BBI Referendum Might Not Take Place
- Expressed BBI Referendum Voting Intention and Main Reasons Yes/No
- BBI Bill Proposals Liked/Disliked by Those Who Say They Would Vote "No"/"Yes"
- Perceived Main Motivation for BBI Reforms
- Main Perceived Reason that Uhuru/Raila support BBI
- Support for Minimum Reforms by Parliament if BBI Does Not Go Forward

# Support for Any Constitutional Changes Before the 2022 Elections: by Total, Region



- ❑ Overall, only about one-third of Kenyans currently support making any changes to the Constitution before next year's elections, by any means.
- ❑ In regional terms, residents of Nyanza and Coast regions are most positive about this (however moderately), while residents of Central and North Eastern are the least positive.




Q. "Do you support having any changes made to the Constitution before the next election?"

# Support for Any Constitutional Changes Before the 2022 Elections: by Total – Trend Analysis: December 2020 vs. June 2021




- Among all Kenyans, there has been a clear if modest decline in support over the last half-year for any changes to the Constitution between now and next year's election.



# Self-Assessed Knowledge of the Content of the BBI Reform Bill: by Total, Gender, Setting




- Slightly fewer than half of all Kenyans (47%) say they know “nothing” about the proposed BBI reforms, but rather more women than men give this self-assessment (56% vs. 37%). In terms of setting, urban-dwellers are slightly more familiar with them than are the rural counterparts (with 8% vs. 5% stating that they know “a great deal” about them).



# Self-Assessed Knowledge of the Content of the BBI Reform Bill: by Region




- More residents of North Eastern attest to knowing “a great deal” about it (13%). At the other extreme, residents of Central and Coast are least likely to profess this level of BBI reform-knowledge (4% among both).



# Self-Assessed Knowledge of the Content of the BBI Reform Bill: by Level of Education



□ There is a clear correlation between respondents' level of education and their self-assessed familiarity with the content of the BBI Report. For example, more than twice as many as those without any formal education say they know “nothing” about it as compared with those with any education beyond secondary (85% vs. 33%), though even among the latter, hardly one-in-ten (9%) say that they know “a great deal” about it.




Q. “How much would you say you know about the proposal in the BBI report that was recently made public?”

# Self-Assessed Knowledge of the Content of the BBI Reform Bill: by Total – Trend Analysis: December 2020 vs. June 2021




- Over the last half-year there has been only a modest increase in Kenyans' familiarity with the BBI reform proposals. For example, the proportions of those who say they know "nothing" or "only a little" have decreased (from 53% to 47%, and from 31% to 16%, respectively), while the proportion of those who know "something" has increased (from 9% to 29%). However, the proportion of those claiming to know "a great deal" has remained unchanged (6%).



# Reported Participation in the BBI Process of Self/Anyone Personally Known: by Total, Gender, Setting



□ Fewer than one-in-ten Kenyans (7%) report that they have participated in the BBI process “in any way”, though one-in-five (21%) say that they personally know someone else who has. Reported participation levels for both categories are considerably higher among men than women, as well as slightly so for urban as opposed to rural residents.




Q. “Since the BBI process began, have you participated in it in any way?”

Q. “Do you personally know anyone who participated in the BBI process in any way?”

# Main Ways of Participation in the BBI Process: by Those Who Reported Having Done So



Among the several forms or ways of engagement with the BBI process by those (few) Kenyans who attest to having done so (7%), the two most common are (1) attendance at public hearings to listen the views presented (36%) and (2) presented or sent views to the BBI Steering Committee (28%). However, a significant proportion also mentioned (3) discussing the reforms with others (21%) and (4) attending relevant civic education forums (20%). (Note: The fact all these mentions total 112% indicates that a few people engaged in more than one such forms of participation.)




Q. "In what particular way or ways did you participate?" **MULTIPLE RESPONSE – NOT READ OUT**

Base = 108

# Declared Voting Intention in Future BBI Referendum: by Total



- ❑ As of now, almost twice as many Kenyans say they would vote “no” to reject the BBI Constitutional Amendment bill as would vote “yes” to approve it (31% vs. 19%), with another substantial proportion (18%) stating they would not vote at all.
- ❑ However, one-quarter are undecided as to whether they would vote at all, or how they would vote, if they did (11% and 14%, respectively).




Q. "If the referendum on the BBI proposals was held, today, how would you vote?"

# Declared Voting Intention in a BBI Referendum: by Region



- Regionally, the highest level of support for the BBI reform proposals in terms of stated referendum voting intentions is in Nyanza (“yes” – 28%), followed by Coast (“yes” – 23%). (Yet note that in December the “yes” figure for Nyanza was 52%.)
- On the “no” side, the highest levels are in North Eastern (43%) and Rift Valley (35%).




Q. “If the referendum on the BBI proposals was held, today, how would you vote?”

# Declared Voting Intention in Future BBI Referendum: by Political Party Alignment




□ When correlated with expressed political party support, there are clear contrasts in terms of stated BBI referendum voting intentions. For example, whereas a majority of ODM supporters declare an intention to vote “yes” (59%), fewer than one-in-ten UDA supporters (9%) do so. Jubilee supporters occupy an intermediate position on this issue.



Q. “If the referendum on the BBI proposals was held, today, how would you vote?”


# Main Reasons for Voting “Yes” in a BBI Referendum: by Those Who Say They Would Vote “Yes”



□ Among the 19% who declared that they would vote “yes” in a BBI referendum, the two most frequently (single) reasons given were more money to be allocated to counties ( 27%) and the creation of a Ward Development Fund (11%).

□ At the same time, a significant proportion (10%) gave non-applicable responses, while even more (25%) gave no responses at all.


# BBI Proposed Reforms Disliked: by Those Who Would Vote 'Yes'



Among those prepared to vote 'yes' in a forthcoming BBI referendum, the proposals attracting the most negative mentions are the increased budgetary allocation to the counties (9%) and the creation of 70 new parliamentary constituencies (8%), both evidently due to cost.

At the same time, nearly one-in-five (17%) said there was nothing they find objectionable, while more than one-third (38%) gave no response at all.


# Main Reasons for Voting “No” in Any Forthcoming BBI Referendum: by Those Who Say They Would Vote “No”



Among the 31% who said they intended to vote “no” in a BBI referendum, the most frequently cited reason (10%) is the increased budgetary allocation to the counties. There were also significant mentions of “the use of government resources to promote BBI, the creation of new leadership positions in parliament, and the creation of 70 news constituencies (8%, 8%, and 7%, respectively).

At the same time, one-third (32%) were either “not sure”, gave inapplicable answers, or gave none at all.

# BBI Proposed Reforms Liked: by Those Who Would Vote 'No'




- ❑ Among those who indicated they would vote “no” in a BBI referendum, those proposals that received the most positive mentions are increased budgetary allocation to the counties (10%) and the creation of 70 new parliamentary constituencies (5%).
- ❑ However, a full one-third (33%) declined to give any such positive mentions.

# Declared Voting Intention in Future BBI Referendum: by Total - Trend Analysis: December 2020 vs. June 2021



- Overall, there has been a marked drop since December in the proportion of Kenyans stating that they would vote “yes” to approve the BBI reform package in a referendum (from 29% to 19%), but this is explained in part by the significant proportion who say they are undecided as to whether they would vote at all (11% - a response-category not appearing among the December data).
- At the same time, the proportion who state that they would vote “no” is basically unchanged (31% vs. 32%), while those saying they would definitely not vote has declined (from 26% to 18% at present).




Q. “If the referendum on the BBI proposals goes ahead, how would you vote?”

# Perceived Likelihood of Having a BBI Referendum Before the 2022 Election: by Total




□ A clear plurality of Kenyans (34%) consider having a referendum on the proposed BBI reforms before the next election as “not likely at all”, a proportion that is more than four times that of those who consider this possibility as “certain” (8%).



# Perceived Main Reason That the BBI Referendum Might Not Be Held Before the 2022 Election: by Total




Among the various reasons as to why the BBI referendum might not be held before the next election, the judicial process was the most frequently mentioned (29%), followed by a lack of sufficient time (12%). However, a plurality of respondents (35%) were not certain about this. At the same, some (6%) are certain that it will, in fact, take place.



# Perceived Main Motivation or Purpose of Those Backing the Proposed BBI Reforms



- Overall, a clear plurality of Kenyans (43%) perceive the main motivation behind the push for the BBI reforms as related to efforts to influence the outcome of the next election. At the same time, a sizable minority (25%) consider it to be an undertaking of both politicians and citizens aimed at addressing certain problems the country is facing. Rather fewer (15%) consider it an effort by citizens themselves to do this, with a similar proportion (15%) being uncertain about what really is motivating this effort.




Q. "Regarding the BBI campaign to change the Constitution, which of the following is closest to your own view?" **OPTIONS READ OUT**

# Perceived Main Motivation or Purpose of the Proposed BBI Reforms: by PPA (Three Main Political Parties)



- There are clear, if modest, contrasts regarding the perceived motivations for BBI among supporters of the main political parties. For example, rather more UDA supporters view it as “an effort to influence the next election” as compared with those who identify with either ODM or Jubilee (50% vs. 28% and 37%, respectively). Conversely, rather more ODM supporters view it as an effort by “both politicians and citizens to address the situation in the country” as do those of either Jubilee or UDA (39% vs. 31% and 22%, respectively).




# Perceived Main Motivations of Uhuru/Raila for Their Support of BBI



Kenyans have rather contrasting perceptions as to the main reasons that Uhuru and Raila have been (and remain) such avid supporters of the proposed BBI constitutional reforms. In large part, this reflects their contrasting situations: the former as an outgoing President and the latter as (again) a potential presidential candidate. However, for both, “encouraging/building national unity” is the second most frequently mentioned motivation.




## Main Perceived Motivations: Uhuru



Q. “What do you think is the main reason that President Uhuru supports the BBI amendment bill?”



## Main Perceived Motivations: Raila




Q. “What do you think is the main reason that Raila supports the BBI amendment bill?”

# Intention to Vote 'Yes'/'No' in Referendum: by Level of Knowledge of Contents of BBI Reforms



There is a significant correlation between the level of self-professed knowledge of the BBI Report's proposals and declared voting intentions. Specifically, those who claim "a great deal" of the knowledge of the BBI reforms more than one-third as inclined to vote 'yes' as compared with those intending to vote 'no' (49% vs. 33%). Even more contrasting, those who profess "a great deal" of knowledge of the reforms are five times more inclined to vote "yes" as those who say they know "nothing" about them (49% vs. 10%), while those who say they know "nothing" are nearly three times more numerous about those with this reported level of knowledge and who state they would vote "yes" (26% vs. 10%).



Q. "If the referendum on the BBI proposals was held, today, how would you vote?"


Q. "How much would you say you know about the proposal in the BBI report that was recently made public?"

Base = 651

# Support for Minimum Reforms Through Parliament if the BBI Process Cannot Continue: by Total, PPA (Main Three Parties)



- ❑ Among all Kenyans, there is a nearly even split between those who do and do not favor having parliament enact some of the BBI proposals that do not require a referendum (i.e., “minimum reforms” – 41% in favor, 45% opposed).
- ❑ Across the main three political parties, however, there are greater contrasts. For example, about half of ODM supporters (51%) favor this option, only about one-third of UDA supporters (37%) do so. Supporters of Jubilee occupy a middle position on this, and are almost evenly split (44% in favor, 45% opposed).




Q. “If the BBI referendum process is completely stopped by the Courts, would you support parliament enacting the proposed reforms that do not require a referendum?”

## Support for Minimum Reforms Through Parliament: by Expressed BBI Referendum Voting Intentions (Among Just Those Who Say They Would Vote 'Yes'/'No')



- More of those indicating that they would vote 'yes' in a BBI referendum are also supportive of having parliament enact "minimum reforms" that do not require a referendum if this latter process cannot take place as compared with those who state that they would vote 'no' (56% vs. 35%). (Very few of those who are not sure how they feel about this parliamentary option had indicated that they would participate in a BBI referendum.)



Q. "If the BBI referendum process is completely stopped by the Courts, would you support parliament enacting the proposed reforms that do not require a referendum?"



# Conclusions

With reference to the findings presented above, the following points can be offered:

- ❑ While the precise impact of the High Court's (at least temporary) nullification of the BBI process cannot be measured, the decline in support for it appears to reflect the preponderance of negative expectations about having the required referendum before the next election (with 46% considering this either “very unlikely” and another 34% ruling it out altogether, as opposed to only 20% who consider it “certain” or “very likely” to take place).
- ❑ At the same time, a positive outcome of the appeal process (in terms of overturning most if not all of the bases of the High Court's decision could have an impact on both expectations and views of a perhaps equal magnitude (whatever the calendar-challenges that would apply).
- ❑ Whatever this outcome, it is clear that certain views captured in this survey are probably less dependent on such future events, among them: the widespread conviction that 2022 electoral (i.e., presidential) politics has been an integral part of the BBI reform effort. Considering that it emerged as a direct product of the March 9, 2018 ‘hand-shake’ between the President and former Prime Minister – itself in the wake of the highly contentious, and in some instances, violent – 2017 presidential contest, such a perception is not surprising. Yet, as has been seen, future events could likewise alter such perceptions, and in ways that no survey could predict.





# Methodology and Demographics


# Methodology Overview




Fieldwork Dates	24 <sup>th</sup> to 28 <sup>th</sup> June 2021
Geographical	Nationally Representative Sample
Data collection	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>▪ Telephonic Interviews conducted (with respondents whose contacts were collected through face-to-face (i.e., household-based interviews)</li><li>▪ The interviews conducted in Kiswahili (mainly) and English.</li></ul>
Sample	1,500 respondents
Margin of error	+/- 2.53 % (Note: Larger error-margins for sub-samples)




### Setting & Region



### Gender




### Age Group






### Education level



### Employment Status





## For Inquiries and Suggestions, Contact:

Dr Tom Wolf  
Research Analyst  
[tpwolf1944@gmail.com](mailto:tpwolf1944@gmail.com)

Maggie Ileri  
CEO  
[Maggie.ileri@tifaresearch.com](mailto:Maggie.ileri@tifaresearch.com)

[www.tifaresearch.com](http://www.tifaresearch.com)