



2022 Elections Survey

Election Participation, Parties & Coalitions, the Presidential Contest, and Related Election Issues

June Omnibus Survey | 11th July 2022

Introduction and Summary Findings

Section One: Voting Status and Intention

Section Two: Political Parties & Coalitions

Section Three: The Presidential Contest

Section Four: Evaluations of the Jubilee Government/ President Kenyatta

Section Five: Other Correlations

Section Six: Concluding Comments

Section Seven: Methodology & Demographics



Introduction and Summary Findings



- ❑ This Release reports results obtained from the national survey TIFA Research conducted between 25th to 30th June, 2022. The survey topics focus mainly on issues related to the forthcoming election.
- ❑ These results at least partly reflect a number of major developments that have occurred since TIFA's previous survey that was conducted in mid-May, immediately after the announcements by presidential candidates DP William Ruto and former Prime Minister Raila Odinga of their deputy presidential running-mates: Mathira MP Rigathi Gachagua by the former, and former Gichugu MP and Cabinet Minister Martha Karua by the latter.
- ❑ In addition to the results presented here, the survey contained a series of questions about the perceived electoral-benefits of these running-mates as well as the issues deemed most pressing by Kenyans and which are also reflected in their top-priority, 'must-do', list for whomever ascends to power after the votes cast on August 9 are tallied and the results announced.
- ❑ In addition to the continuing campaign activity of these two would-be presidents and their associates, recent weeks have seen the emergence of the two other presidential candidates who had met the IEBC's qualifications to contest by the time the survey was conducted: George Wajackoyah and David Mwaure Waihiga, and their running-mates. Even following the exclusion of a number of other, 'would-be' presidential contenders by a recent court decision, the presence of just these two 'extra' candidates at least raises the possibility that their presence on the ballot could deny either of the front-runner a clear, first round win, thus triggering an second round, and unprecedented, run-off contest.

- ❑ Given the above described context, this survey aimed to address these among several other questions:
 - 1) What does the combination of (self-declared) registered voters and likelihood of voting figures indicate in terms of the level of interest/enthusiasm regarding this election, at least for the presidential contest? And what reasons are given by those stating that they are not registered?
 - 2) What are the levels of self-identification as supporters of the various political parties and coalitions, and to what extent do these overlap (in terms of those supporting particular parties also supporting the coalition to which their preferred party belongs)?
 - 3) The recent trend has shown a steady rise for Raila Odinga with William Ruto's rating largely stagnant. Has this continued or has there been a reversal of any sort? More specifically, how concentrated/dispersed is such expressed support for these two presidential candidates across the country's various regions or zones?
 - 4) Whatever the current Odinga vs. Ruto results, has there been any discernable impact of the addition of their respective running-mates to their tickets: Martha Karua to Odinga's and Rigathi Gachagua's to Ruto's?



5) To what extent do differences in particular demographic variables or divergent views on particular issues provide an answer to the question: “What do some Kenyans support Kenya Kwanza (and/or its affiliated political parties) and William Ruto, while others supports Azimio la Umoja (and/or its affiliated political parties) and Odinga? In other words, is there any evidence that Kenya has moved towards one of Vision 2030’s governance goals of “more issue-based politics”?



- ❑ While this Release does not attempt to answer any of these questions in full, it is hoped that the data it contains provides a foundation for further research – through whatever combination of methodologies - that could yield a better-informed understanding of these and related issues. That is, while there is




Summary Findings

Political Party and Political Coalition Popularity


Political Party Popularity

☐ UDA is the most popular party followed by ODM




Political Coalition Popularity

☐ Azimio La Umoja has the highest support.



Preferred Presidential Candidate






Section One: Voting Status and Intention

- Voter Registration Status & Reasons (for not being registered)
- Ability to Name Own Polling Station
- Expressed Likelihood of Voting & Reasons (for not being certain to vote)

Registered Voters (self-declared) by total, gender, age



☐ Rather more respondents declared themselves to be registered voters than the IEBC figure of 22.1 million indicates (94%: this figure being only about 85% of Kenya's current adult population). More men declare this than women, and the declared figure increases with age-groupings (from 84% among those in the youngest category to 99% among those in the oldest).



Q: "Are you a registered voter?" **SINGLE RESPONSE**


Base = 1,533 (all respondents)

Registered Voters (self-declared) by total, zone



Among the nine zones, only two are above the national average of self-declared registered voters (94%), the highest being Lower Eastern (97%), while four are below it, including South Rift, the only one for which the figure falls below one-in-ten (88%).

% stating that they are registered voters




Could Name One's Own Polling Station

by total, gender, age (among those reporting to be registered voters)



❑ Not all of those who self-reported as being registered voters could give the name of their polling station, especially those in the youngest age category (91%). Of those who could not, it is impossible to discern what proportion simply cannot remember their polling station's name and what proportion are those who sought to transfer their place of registration but have yet to learn if their efforts were successful. At the same time, it is possible that some of these respondents were unable to name a polling station because they are not actually registered.




Main Reason for Not Being a Registered Voter

by those 6% stating that they are not registered voters



- Nearly half of those stating they are not registered to vote (just 6%) attribute this to “being too busy” during the voter registration period(s). It should be noted, however, that nearly three quarters of those reporting not to be registered (73%) are in the youngest age category (18-24), one fifth of whom stating that they never had a required ID or passport. Yet twice as many in this same age groupings (42%) say that they were “too busy” during the registration period to do this, suggesting a lack of interest in politics, or at least in voting. (Non-registered voters in other age categories are too few for sufficient statistical reliability regarding the distribution of their reasons.)




Declared Likelihood of Voting

by those who state they are registered voters, supporters of Odinga/Ruto



Among all registered voters, more than two-thirds (70%) assert that they “will definitely vote” on August 9, with only one-in-ten (10%) certain that they will not do so (for whatever reasons). These figures are statistically identical with those obtained from those stating that they will vote for either of the main two presidential contenders, Odinga and Ruto, suggesting further that (as of now, at least) the potential voter turnout for each of them is likely to be very similar.



Q. “In the August elections, which of the following statements is most true for you?” SINGLE RESPONSE –READ OUT


Base = 1,446 (registered voters)

Declared Likelihood of Voting

by total, zone (among self-declared registered voters)



There is a moderate level of variation across the country with regard to the declared likelihood of voting on August 9, with five of the nine zones at or above the national average of those saying they “will definitely vote” (70%), the highest being Nairobi, Nyanza and Western (74%) and four zones below it, the lowest being Coast (57%). (Note that actual voter turnout in the latter region has been consistently the lowest both before after the promulgation of the 2010 Constitution, e.g 64% in 2017.)



Q. “In the August elections, which of the following statements is most true for you?” SINGLE RESPONSE – READ OUT


Base = 1,446 (registered voters)

Declared Likelihood of Voting

by total, zone (among those say they are not registered voters)



- Among those declaring that they are not registered voters, while a clear majority report that they “will definitely not vote”, a surprisingly large minority (11%) assert that they will “definitely vote”, though it would have been interesting to ask them just how they believe they will be able to do that. This leaves two other response-groups who say either that they “will probably vote” (7%) and that they “will probably not vote” (12%).






Section Two: Political Parties & Coalitions

- Political Party Alignment
- Previously Supported Political Party (within the last ten years)
- Political Coalition Support

Political Party Alignment (by total)



- ❑ UDA remains the most popular political party (33%), with another one-quarter (26%) aligned to ODM, leaving all other parties with less than half of this figure (13%).
- ❑ This leaves more than one-quarter (28%) who neither “feel close to” nor “support” any party or are undecided about this – perhaps surprising given how close the country is to the next general election.

Political Party Alignment

by total, zone



- Only UDA and ODM can claim a substantial level of nationwide support. Support for the two next most popular parties – Jubilee and Wiper - is quite concentrated in particular regions (Mt. Kenya and Lower Eastern, respectively), with the same applying to ANC, DAP-K and FORD-Kenya. The newest party to enter the scene, Roots, is equally popular in Central Rift and Mt. Kenya zones.

| Political Party | Total | Central Rift | Coast | Lower Eastern | Mt Kenya | Nairobi | Northern | Nyanza | South Rift | Western |
|----------------------|-------|--------------|-------|---------------|----------|---------|----------|--------|------------|---------|
| UDA | 33% | 56% | 23% | 27% | 45% | 26% | 48% | 11% | 23% | 22% |
| ODM | 26% | 10% | 35% | 16% | 9% | 33% | 17% | 57% | 31% | 32% |
| Jubilee | 4% | 4% | 2% | 4% | 8% | 3% | 11% | 3% | 7% | 0% |
| Roots Party of Kenya | 3% | 4% | 2% | 2% | 4% | 1% | 0% | 3% | 2% | 2% |
| Wiper | 2% | 0% | 1% | 18% | 0% | 2% | 0% | 1% | 4% | 0% |
| ANC | 1% | 1% | 0% | 0% | 0% | 0% | 1% | 0% | 0% | 5% |
| DAP-K | 1% | 0% | 0% | 2% | 0% | 1% | 0% | 0% | 0% | 3% |
| FORD-K | 1% | 0% | 0% | 0% | 0% | 0% | 1% | 0% | 0% | 5% |
| Others (9 mentioned) | 1% | 1% | 1% | 2% | 3% | 2% | 3% | 0% | 0% | 2% |
| Undecided | 11% | 9% | 16% | 12% | 14% | 10% | 4% | 10% | 18% | 9% |
| None | 12% | 10% | 18% | 11% | 13% | 17% | 13% | 10% | 8% | 13% |
| NR | 5% | 5% | 3% | 6% | 5% | 5% | 2% | 7% | 8% | 6% |

Q. "What political party or alliance do you support most or feel closest to now, if any?" SINGLE RESPONSE – DO NOT READ OUT

Base = all respondents


Political Party Alignment

by supporters of Odinga/Ruto




Considerably more of those stating their intention to vote for Ruto also support the party that leads (UDA) as compared to those intending to vote for Raila with regard to his party (ODM). In part, this reflects the fact that Odinga’s Azimio la Umoja coalition has more than twice as many parties as does Ruto’s Kenya Kwanza (26 vs. 11). This reality also indicates why Azimio has a more challenging task in ‘managing’ its parties in terms of minimizing the electoral contests in which its several candidates could divide the Azimio vote, thus making it much easier for Kenya Kwanza candidates to win.

Political Parties of Odinga’s Supporters



Political Parties of Ruto’s Supporters




Other Political Party Supported Within the Last Ten Years (by the 44% who did so) by total, political party (among those who support any (which) political party now)



Among the main political parties who have gained supporters by ‘poaching’ supporters of other political parties, most prominent is UDA, with three-quarters of them (76%) stating that they formally supported Jubilee, though one-third of them (35%) say that they supported ODM in the past. Although the still-small Roots party is very new, it has attracted people who previously supported Jubilee (49%) as well as ODM (28%), and even a few from UDA (7%).

Political Party Supported Now

Previous Political Party Supported



Base = those who present any political party and who supporters another one previously

Q. "Is there any (other) party you supported or belonged to in the last 10 years?"


Q: "Which one was that?" IF MORE THAN ONE PARTY MENTIONED, ASK: "What is the most recent other one?" SINGLE RESPONSE – DO NOT READ

Political Party Alignment: Trend Analysis

June 2020 – June 2022



- Over the last two years, the two most dramatic changes in the popularity of political parties have been (1) the decline of Jubilee (from 40% to 4%) and the appearance/rise of UDA (from nothing to 33%), making it currently the most popular party.
- At the same time, the proportion of those declining to name a preferred political party over this period has fluctuated, most recently doubling from what it was in TIFA's most recent survey (from 13% to 26%).



Q. "What political party or alliance do you support most or feel closest to now, if any?"


Base = all respondents

Political Coalition Support

By total, zone (among registered voters)



While the Azimio La Umoja coalition attracts slightly more national support than does Kenya Kwanza (42% vs. 35%), the latter dominates in Central Rift and Mt. Kenya, while Azimio does so everywhere else aside from Northern and Western where the margins between them are quite modest. However, the fact that neither achieves two-thirds support in any of the nine zones helps to explain why their respective campaign efforts continue to crisscross/overlap each other, sometimes almost on a daily basis.




Political Coalition Support

by total, supporters of ODM/UDA (of their respective coalitions)



□ Slightly more Kenyans expressed support for Azimio La Umoja than for the Kenya Kwanza Alliance (42% vs. 35%), still leaving about one-quarter who identify with neither coalition, though this has declined since TIFA's April survey (31%).

□ Further, while nearly all ODM supporters also support the Azimio coalition (98%), a smaller proportion of UDA supporters (87%) identify with Kenya Kwanza, this perhaps being a reflection of the fact that this coalition has far fewer member-parties (11 vs. 26 within Azimio), so that the very notion of a coalition is less relevant for some UDA supporters. Conversely, it suggests a slightly higher level of 'ownership' of their coalition by ODM supporters.



Q. "Which political grouping or formation that is preparing for next year's election ones do you feel closest to or support?"

Base = all respondents



Section Three: The Presidential Contest


- ❑ Perceived Importance of Running-Mates/Level of Satisfaction with Running-Mates of Odinga/Ruto by their Respective Supporters
- ❑ Preferred Next President and Issue-Correlations

Perceived Importance of Running-Mate to Choice of Presidential Candidate/Proportion “Very Satisfied” with Their Choices of Running-Mates

by total, supporters of Odinga/Ruto



While two-thirds of Kenyans consider the identity of the running-mate as “very important” to them in terms of their choice for president, there is a clear contrast between supporters of/prospective voters for Odinga and Ruto, with those of the former considering this factor rather more important to them than do the latter (80% vs. 62%).



Base = all respondents

Q. “Whomever you are going to vote for as president, would you say his choice of a deputy president running-mate is...? SINGLE RESPONSE - READ OUT


Q: “ How satisfied are you with Raila’s/Ruto’s choice of Martha Karua/Rigathi Gachagua as his deputy president running-mate? Are you...?” SINGLE RESPONSE – READ OUT

Preferred Next President

by total



- ❑ With just over a month until the election, Raila Odinga maintains a very narrow lead over William Ruto for the presidential contest (42% vs. 39%), actually falling within the survey's margin-of-error (+/-2.7%).
- ❑ The recent appearance and rise of one of the two other candidates, Prof. George Wajakoyah of the Roots Party of Kenya (now at 4%; David Mwaure of the Agano Party failed to elicit more than miniscule support in this survey) at least raises the possibility that neither Odinga nor Ruto will be able to secure an outright, first round win. But this possibility should be more accurately assessed on the basis of TIFA's next pre-election survey in a few weeks.



Preferred Next President

By total, zone



Looking at the distribution of support for the two main presidential candidates (and their running-mates) across the country, to little surprise, each is most popular in their 'native' zones: Ruto in Central Rift (63%) and Raila in Nyanza (68%). Ruto's second most popular zone is Northern with Mt. Kenya close behind (55% and 53%, respectively), whilst Raila's is Nairobi (58%). For his part, Wajackoyah scores highest in South Rift (8%) followed by Lower Eastern (7%).

| | Total | Central Rift | Coast | Lower Eastern | Mt Kenya | Nairobi | Northern | Nyanza | South Rift | Western |
|------------------|-------|--------------|-------|---------------|----------|---------|----------|--------|------------|---------|
| Odinga-Karua | 42% | 20% | 50% | 46% | 24% | 58% | 35% | 68% | 45% | 48% |
| Ruto-Gachagua | 39% | 63% | 26% | 29% | 53% | 28% | 55% | 13% | 33% | 37% |
| Wajackoyah-Wamae | 4% | 4% | 5% | 7% | 6% | 4% | 1% | 2% | 8% | 3% |
| Undecided | 10% | 11% | 15% | 10% | 12% | 6% | 6% | 12% | 7% | 7% |
| No Response | 4% | 2% | 4% | 7% | 4% | 4% | 3% | 4% | 8% | 4% |

Change in Presidential Candidate Popularity: Ruto-Gachagua

May vs. June 2022 = Difference

By total, zone



Support for Ruto nationally has increased modestly over the last six weeks (from 35% to 39%), his major gains being in Northern (by 15%) and in Nairobi and Western (9% in both). He has also enjoyed an increase in support from Mt. Kenya (by 7%), the home area of his running-mate. However, he has suffered a significant loss of support only in South Rift (of 33%), but given its relatively small population, this was clearly not sufficient to prevent his overall/national increase (as noted, of 4%).

| | Total | Central Rift | Coast | Lower Eastern | Mt Kenya | Nairobi | Northern | Nyanza | South Rift | Western |
|------------|-------|--------------|-------|---------------|----------|---------|----------|--------|------------|---------|
| May | 35% | 59% | 27% | 23% | 46% | 19% | 40% | 11% | 66% | 26% |
| June | 39% | 63% | 26% | 29% | 53% | 28% | 55% | 13% | 33% | 37% |
| Difference | +4% | +4% | -1% | +6% | +7% | +9% | +15% | +2% | -33% | +9% |

Change in Presidential Candidate Popularity: Odinga-Karua

May vs. June 2022 = Difference

By total, zone




□ Nationally, the expressed voting intention for Odinga has increased slightly since mid-May (by 3%), his largest gain being in South Rift (17%), though his gains in Lower Eastern and Nairobi (10% and 9%, respectively) are also impressive. Significantly, in those regions where such voting intentions for him declined they are very minor, the largest being Northern (just 2%). At the same time, the addition of Karua as his running-mate has yielded no change in the support-level he enjoys in Mt. Kenya (the same as in mid-May: 24%), just over half the level support enjoyed by Ruto (as shown elsewhere, at 53%)

| | Total | Central Rift | Coast | Lower Eastern | Mt Kenya | Nairobi | Northern | Nyanza | South Rift | Western |
|------------|-------|--------------|-------|---------------|----------|---------|----------|--------|------------|---------|
| May | 39% | 17% | 49% | 36% | 24% | 49% | 37% | 69% | 28% | 49% |
| June | 42% | 20% | 50% | 46% | 24% | 58% | 35% | 68% | 45% | 48% |
| Difference | +3% | +3% | +1% | +10% | 0% | +9% | -2% | -1% | +17% | -1% |

Preferred Next President (and since May, with Running-Mate): Trend Analysis: June 2020 – June 2022



- Over the last two years, DP Ruto's presidential candidate popularity has remained within a very narrow range: between 35% and 39%. For his part, Odinga's rating climbed from just 15% to its current level of 42%, his highest rating yet. However, since Ruto has gained since TIFA's previous survey, the gap between them is lightly smaller (3% rather than 4%, though this gap between them falls within the survey's margin-of-error of +/-2.7%), possibly making this result, in fact, a tie).
- It is also seen that those either "undecided" or who declined to answer this question (combined) has fallen almost in half since mid-May (from 22% to 14%). Finally, it will be important to see whether the individual or combined vote-attraction of the other two confirmed presidential candidates, Prof. George Wajakoyah and David Mwaure will obtain enough votes to deny either Odinga or Ruto a first round 50%+1 victory.



Base = all respondents; from June only potential voters



Preferred Next President with Running-Mate

by gender, age

Comparing the main presidential contenders and their running-mates in terms of gender, more men than women support both Odinga-Karua and Ruto-Gachagua, though Odinga has a slight 'male advantage' in this regard (a 10% margin as opposed to Ruto's 2% margin). Overall, however, three times more women than men remain undecided (15% vs. 5%). With regard, to age, there is no statistical difference in their levels of support, but Wajackoyah is clearly more favored by younger would-be voters (7% in the 18-24 age-group vs. 2% among those older than 35).


| Presidential Pairs | Male | Female | | 18-24 years | 35+ years |
|-----------------------------------|------|--------|--|-------------|-----------|
| Raila Odinga & Martha Karua | 47% | 37% | | 43% | 42% |
| William Ruto & Rigathi Gachagua | 40% | 38% | | 38% | 41% |
| George Wajackoyah & Justina Wamae | 5% | 4% | | 7% | 2% |
| David Mwaure & Ruth Mutua | 0% | 0% | | 0% | 0% |
| Undecided | 5% | 15% | | 9% | 11% |
| NR | 3% | 6% | | 3% | 5% |

Preferred Next President with Running-Mate: Odinga

by gender




Not once over the last two years have more women expressed more support than men with regard to Odinga's presidential ambitions. Moreover, the addition of a female running-mate (Martha Karua) appears (so far, at least) to have had no impact on increasing his support among women, as the current 'gender gap' (of 10%) is identical to what it was in April, shortly before he announced his choice of her to fill this position. In fact, it has even increased very marginally from what it was immediately after May 16 (8%), the day he made this announcement.



Preferred Next President with Running-Mate: Ruto by gender



Over the last two years, the two genders have 'traded places' in terms of which has given Ruto more support. At present, however, they are statistically tied, (of just 2%, within this survey's margin-of-error). However – and perhaps curiously – his support among women since TIFA's previous (mid-May) survey has increased significantly more among women (by 6%), even though he chose a male (Gachagua) as a running-mate, in contrast to Odinga who chose a female (Karua).




Current Monthly Earnings

By total, supporters of Ruto, Odinga (among household heads only)



- Overall, some one-third of household heads (34%) report earning anything from nothing to Shs. 5,000/- per month, while fewer than one-in-five report incomes of above Shs. 20,000/-.
- In comparing such income-figures among those declaring their support for Ruto and Odinga, however, there is a slight contrast in this regard, with slightly more of the former's supporters in this lowest monthly income category as compared with Odinga's, (33% vs. 31%). Given the fact that in the last three elections Odinga's supporters were markedly poorer than Kibaki's/Kenyatta's, these figures suggest that he is no longer an 'electoral magnet' for the poorest Kenyans as such; rather, they are both seeking to appeal to people in the same income categories.



Q: About how much, if anything, are you currently earning each month?
Q: "If elections were to be held today, which presidential candidate would you vote for?"

Base = 1,043 (household heads)

Section Four: Evaluations of the Jubilee Government/ President Kenyatta


- Perceived Successes/Failure of the Jubilee Government
- Presidential Approval Ratings

Two Main (Selected) Successes of Jubilee Government Since 2017

By supporters of Odinga/Ruto



Examination of a selection of responses to a question about the Jubilee government's successes since 2017, a few contrasts emerge that suggest their political nature, if to only a modest degree. This can be seen in the higher proportion of Odinga supporters who mentioned peace and security, as well as infrastructure and economic growth, as well as devolution, mentioned by three times as many Odinga supporters. But it is also evident in the higher proportion of Ruto supporters who declined to mention any.




Two Main (Selected) Failures of Jubilee Government Since 2017

By supporters of Odinga/Ruto



□ With regard to the two main perceived failures of the Jubilee government since 2017, supporters of the two main presidential candidates are largely in agreement about the impact of the cost-of-living and debt, though rather more Odinga support cite employment, corruption, and education. For their part, Ruto supporters more often mention issues related to economic growth, agriculture and peace/security. Further, twice as many of them cite divisions within government – an obvious reflection of the strains between the president and his deputy during this period.




President Uhuru's Approval Rating

By total, supporters of Odinga/Ruto



- Overall, Kenyans give President Uhuru a middle-level or 'average' score for his performance since the last election, with twice as many giving him a rating of "3" as do those giving him a rating of both "2" and "4".
- However, there is a clear if not absolute contrast between Odinga's and Ruto's supporters, with their combined positive ("4" + "5") and negative ("0" + "1") ratings being near-mirror/reverse images of each other. Still, more than a quarter of Odinga's supporters (29%) give him the two lowest (combined) rating, while one-in-five of Ruto's (21%) give him the two highest (combined) one.



Q: "On a scale from 0 to 5, where "0" is very bad and "5" is very good, how would you score Uhuru Kenyatta's performance as president since the last election?"



Section Five: Other Correlations


- Confidence in the IEBC
- Confidence in the Supreme Court (for adjudicated presidential petitions)
- Perceived Motivations for Contesting Elections

Level of Confidence in the IEBC

By total, supporters of Ruto, Raila



□ A modest majority of Kenyans express a high level of confidence that the IEBC will deliver a “fair and honest” election on August 9. However, slightly more Ruto supporters hold this view than do Odinga’s (65% vs. 59%), even if an identical proportion of both lack confidence that this this will be achieved (16% and 15%, respectively).




Level of Confidence in the Supreme Court

By total, supporters of Ruto, Odinga



Overall, six-in-ten Kenyans express confidence that any presidential election petition that goes to the Supreme Court after the August 9 election will be adjudicated fairly, without any outside interference. Significantly, there is no statistical contrast between Ruto and Odinga supporters on this issue. Moreover, for both groups the level of such positivity is slightly higher than the national average.



Base = all respondents


Q: "Do you have confidence that if any presidential election petition is taken to the Supreme Court after the August 9 election the case will be decided fairly without interference?"

Perceived Motivation of Most Candidates for Elective Offices

By total, supporters of Ruto, Raila



Overall, more Kenyans believe that people become candidates for elective office to pursue their own personal/family interests rather than to serve those of their community or country (53% vs. 38%). However, there is little difference on this issue between ODM and UDA supporters, with only slightly more of each group holding this view (51% vs. 42% and 51% vs. 41%, respectively). Among supporters of the two main presidential candidates, there is a slightly larger contrast, with more of Odinga's supporters than Ruto's holding the 'negative' view of such motivation (55% vs. 50%).



Q: "Some people decide to become candidates in elections for many reasons. Thinking about this, which of the following reason is closest to your own view?"

SINGLE RESPONSE – READ OUT

Base = all respondents



Section Six: Concluding Comments

Concluding Comments

Several points can be made with regard to several of the findings included in this 1st Release of TIFA's April, 2022 survey:

- ❑ The first is that while UDA continues to attract the popularity as a party, the coalition of which ODM is the main member, Azimio la Umoja, is rather more popular than Kwanza Alliance, whose leading member is UDA. This may reflect the fact that the former incorporates far more political parties than does the latter (26 vs. 11).
- ❑ The second is that while Raila Odinga retains the lead he attained in TIFA's previous survey, his lead-margin over William Ruto has not increased; though falling with this survey's margin-of-error, it has slightly declined, so that they are now separated by just 3% rather than by 4%. At the same time, the publicity surrounding the candidacy of George Wajackoyah has had a measurable impact of the presidential contest, with his 4% rating (and 7% among) young suggesting the possibility that (even without any significant vote-attraction by the other 'minor' candidate, David Mwaure, it now seems as least possible that a second round contest might be necessary. Just how popular Wajackoya would have to become in numbers of vote-numbers to produce this outcome remains unclear, however.



Concluding Comments (con't)



- ❑ It is not clear just how much the addition of their respective deputy president running-mates has affected either of their standings in terms of declared voting intentions. Even if 90% of all respondents in TIFA's mid-May survey could correctly identify Martha Karua as Odinga's running-mate, her position on the ballot together with her campaign presence had not made any measurable impact subsequently, though the same can be said for Ruto's choice of Rigathi Gachagua. More precisely, the fact that both of their ratings have risen slightly is almost entirely a reflection of the decrease in the proportion stating their were "undecided" or otherwise declined to name a preferred candidate – from 22% to 14%.
- ❑ With specific regard to the 'gender factor', it is seen that support for Odinga and Ruto is statistically identical among women. The former can thus thank his higher level of support among men for the very modest lead he enjoys overall (as noted, of 3%). But this fact also serves to dispel (so far, at least) that having a woman as his running-mate has, ipso facto, increased support for him among this section of the electorate (though it is possible that this fact has helped his standing among men, and that on August 9 more of his female supporters will actually vote as would have been the case otherwise).
- ❑ Slightly fewer Kenyans at the bottom of the income 'ladder' now support the Deputy President than the former Prime Minister, with the more affluent conversely backing the latter only slightly more than the former (even so, a reversal of Odinga's support-position in the last three elections). Given the overall very modest incomes of the electorate, however, there is clearly no clear basis for 'class politics' at the national level .



Concluding Comments (con't)

- ❑ In terms of their evaluations of the Jubilee government's successes and failures, Ruto supporters are somewhat less willing to give it credit for anything, though in terms of failures, there is nearly complete agreement regarding the perceived failure members of both groupings to cushion them against cost-of-living increases, with nearly half of each of them identifying it as one of its “two main failures”, far more frequently mentioned than anything else. It is thus of no surprise that measures to address this issue is perhaps the most commonly mentioned by both campaigns as they continue to traverse the country in the final weeks.
- ❑ Between half and two-thirds of all Kenyans express a high level of confidence in both the IEBC and the Supreme Court to perform their election-related functions fairly, with only marginal contrasts in this regard between Ruto and Odinga supporters (in particular, slightly less confidence in the IEBC by Odinga's). Such confidence-levels will be important to track as the election itself approaches.
- ❑ Similarly, there is only a minimal contrast between these two groups of supporters/would-be voters with regard to the perceived “main motivation” of those who come forward to contest elections (for whatever positions), with only a slight majority attributing such motivation to personal/family interests as opposed to those of the community/nation, though Odinga's supporters are marginally more negative than are Ruto's about this.



Concluding Comments (con't)

- ❑ In planning its next survey, TIFA will carefully consider which of these issues are worth tracking again, and which should be replaced with other critical election-related issues that may arise in the meantime, keeping in mind that due to interview time-constraints, the content of any such survey is limited.
- ❑ In any case, TIFA (like other survey firms, remains grateful to the thousands of Kenyans who readily agree to participate in such surveys and without whom no one would have an idea as to how prepared the country's citizens are to express their preferences on election day, and what issues they want their next set of leaders to address, among many other pressing realities.





Section Seven: Methodology & Demographics

Methodology Overview



| | |
|-----------------|--|
| Fieldwork Date | 25 th June to 30 th June 2022 |
| Geographical | Nationally Representative Sample (spread across 9 Zones ; <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Central Rift, Coast, Lower Eastern, Mt Kenya, Nairobi, Northern, Nyanza, South Rift, Western |
| Data collection | <ul style="list-style-type: none">▪ Telephonic Interviews conducted (with respondents whose contacts were collected through face-to-face (i.e., household-based interviews)▪ The interviews conducted in Kiswahili (mainly) and English.▪ Data collection was conducted in one day due to TIFA's large capacity for outward bound calls, experienced callers and short questionnaire |
| Sample | 1,533 respondents |
| Margin of error | +/- 2.34 % (Note: Larger error-margins for sub-samples) |

Sampling Zones Classification



| County | Region |
|-----------------|---------------|
| Uasin Gishu | Central Rift |
| Elgeyo-Marakwet | Central Rift |
| Nandi | Central Rift |
| Baringo | Central Rift |
| Nakuru | Central Rift |
| Kericho | Central Rift |
| Bomet | Central Rift |
| Mombasa | Coast |
| Kwale | Coast |
| Kilifi | Coast |
| Tana River | Coast |
| Lamu | Coast |
| Taita-Taveta | Coast |
| Kitui | Lower Eastern |
| Machakos | Lower Eastern |
| Makueni | Lower Eastern |


| County | Region |
|-------------|----------|
| Trans Nzoia | Western |
| Kakamega | Western |
| Vihiga | Western |
| Bungoma | Western |
| Busia | Western |
| Garissa | Northern |
| Wajir | Northern |
| Mandera | Northern |
| Marsabit | Northern |
| Isiolo | Northern |
| Turkana | Northern |
| West Pokot | Northern |
| Samburu | Northern |
| Nairobi | Nairobi |

| County | Region |
|---------------|------------|
| Meru | Mt Kenya |
| Tharaka-Nithi | Mt Kenya |
| Embu | Mt Kenya |
| Nyandarua | Mt Kenya |
| Nyeri | Mt Kenya |
| Kirinyaga | Mt Kenya |
| Murang'a | Mt Kenya |
| Kiambu | Mt Kenya |
| Laikipia | Mt Kenya |
| Siaya | Nyanza |
| Kisumu | Nyanza |
| Homa Bay | Nyanza |
| Migori | Nyanza |
| Kisii | Nyanza |
| Nyamira | Nyanza |
| Narok | South Rift |
| Kajiado | South Rift |


Demographics:

Region, Gender, Age, Religion, Setting & Marital Status


Zone




Setting




Gender



Age



Highest education level





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