

2022 Elections: Survey Findings Presidency, Parties, Coalitions & IEBC

#TIFAPresidentialPoll2022

3rd August 2022





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Introductory Comments



This Release reports results obtained from the national survey TIFA Research conducted between 31st July and 1st August, 2022, barely a week since the release of a national survey conducted face-to-face at the household level that was released on 30th July. However, given the speed with which a telephonic (CATI) survey can be conducted, it was considered useful to 'squeeze in' one more and release the results before the legal embargo period for election-related surveys begins: five days prior to the election.




- □ As was the case then, this survey also focuses on issues related to the forthcoming election. In addition to the standard questions about party/coalition alignment and voting intentions, it covers the following, several of which TIFA had not explored in any previous survey:
 - a) How important Kenyans view the six elective offices to be filled in this election.
 - b) How concerned they are about violence during the three remaining parts of the electoral cycle.
 - c) How convinced they are that even if their preferred presidential candidate wins their lives will markedly improve.
- Altogether, it portrays a citizenry that has a fairly level of confidence that the election will take place in a peaceful atmosphere and the results will lead to an improvement in their lives – at least if their preferred presidential candidate (and running-mate) wins!



Section One: Summary Findings

Presidential Candidates Popularity Scenarios



Scenario One Analysis All respondents (registered voters)

Raila Odinga	49 %
William Ruto	41%
	• •
George Wajackoyah	2%
David Mwaure	0.2%
Undecided	8%
** • • · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	

*Mwaure's rounded up to provide his % support.

Scenario Two Analysis Only Decided Voters*

*excludes the undecided

Raila Odinga	53%
William Ruto	45%
George Wajackoyah	2%
David Mwaure	0.2%

Scenario One: All respondents

Shows the presidential candidates popularity amongst registered voters, those who intend to vote and the undecided.

Scenario Two: Decided voters

Excludes the undecided voters in (in scenario one) then the support levels are then distributed proportionately across all candidates.

Cautionary Note

The outcome of the election depends on voter turnout and this cannot be predicted by surveys.

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
Section Two: Political Parties & Coalitions

Political Party Alignment
 Political Coalition Support


Political Party Alignment



More Kenyans identify with UDA, the party led by DP William Ruto than with any other party (38%), though Raila Odinga's ODM's popularity is a close second (at 32%). It should be noted, however, that while Ruto's deputy presidential running-mate, Rigathi Gachagua, is also a UDA member, Odinga's running-mate, Martha Karua, heads her own party – NARC-Kenya. Smaller parties attract the loyalty (and presumably, voting-support) of a large number of smaller parties (16%, starting with Jubilee and Wiper), presumably most relevant for 'down-ballot' contests. Still, a significant proportion chose not to self-identify with any party (15%), which seems to be a rather higher figure so close to the election, at least when compared with similar previous survey data.



□ Since TIFA's last survey, no major changes in party alignment are seen, aside from a slight decline in support for the two most popular ones (of 2-3%) and an increase in those who are undecided or support none (from 9% to 15%).



Political Party Alignment by total, zone




As in previous TIFA surveys in this election cycle, more areas of the country display a significant level of internal division than in an recent election. That is, while UDA and ODM are far more popular in the home areas of their party leaders (Central Rift and Nyanza) nowhere else does either party attract as much as two-thirds support.

UDA			Coast	Lower Eastern	Mt Kenya	Nairobi	Northern	Nyanza	South Rift	Western
	38%	71%	1 8 %	25%	60%	29 %	35%	13%	45%	22%
ODM	32%	10%	53%	19%	7%	39%	25%	68%	38%	47%
Jubilee	5%	4%	1%	1%	13%	<mark>6</mark> %	12%	1%	4 %	2%
Wiper	4%	0%	5%	37%	0%	3%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Roots party	1%	1%	2%	2%	1%	3%	0%	1%	2%	0%
KANU	1%	1%	1%	0%	0%	1%	9 %	0%	0%	0%
ANC	1%	0%	0%	0%	0%	1%	1%	0%	0%	4%
DAP-K	1%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	5%
FORD-K	1%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	4%
Others	2%	0%	1%	0%	1%	0%	2%	0%	0%	0%
Undecided	4%	3%	3%	7%	6%	3%	3%	5%	2%	4%
NR	2%	2%	2%	1%	2%	3%	2%	3%	1%	2%
None	9%	5%	12%	9%	9%	10%	6%	8%	8%	10%

Q. "What political party or alliance do you support most or feel closest to now, if any?" SINGLE RESPONSE – DO NOT READ OUT


Other Political Party Supported (for "mainly local contests") by total

■ A significant proportion of Kenyans (25%) indicate they have a kind of 'divided loyalty' in terms of party support, even if the relevance of 'other' party supported is mainly for 'down-ballot' contests. Prominent here is Jubilee, with one-quarter of all those declaring support for a second party (24%) naming it. Curiously, perhaps, the second most frequently mentioned 'other' party is the most popular one in the country overall – UDA (14%), as mentioned. Keeping in mind there are more than 80 registered political parties in the country, combined with the fact that both of these leading parties belong to multi-party coalitions, such 'pluralism' at the individual level may not appear that surprising.




Political Coalition Support by total, zone

Likewise the country's high degree of local pluralism, in none of the zones used by TIFA does either coalition attract the support of more than two-thirds of all residents, aside from Odinga's 'home-turf' of Nyanza, and (barely) Ruto's of Central Rift (69% and 65%, respectively). Altogether, however, Azimio out-points Kenya Kwanza in seven zones, leaving only two where Kenya Kwanza predominates.




Elective Seat Considered Most and Least Important by total

Given all the media attention to the presidential contest, TIFA thought it useful to ask Kenyans which elective offices are most important for them. Here, the impact of devolution is clearly seen, with two of those deemed most important county-government positions: governor and MCA (at 29% and 21%, respectively), with that of the president in between the two (at 28%). On the flipside, an overwhelming plurality considers the position of Women Rep of least importance (32%), followed by Senator (15%).



Most Important Position





Least Important Position

Q. "Thinking about the positions you will vote for on Aug. 9 president, governor, senator, MP, women rep and MCA, which one do you consider to be the MOST IMPORTANT?" Q. Thinking about the positions you will vote for on Aug. 9 president, governor, senator, MP, women rep and MCA, which one do you consider to be the LEAST IMPORTANT?"

Elective Seat Considered Most and Least Important by gender

In terms of gender with regard to the perceived importance of the six elective positions that Kenyans will be voting on next Tuesday, several contrasts emerge. On the positive side, rather more men than women consider the governor the most important elective office to them (35% vs. 23%), but more than twice as many women do not have an opinion about this. On the negative side, nearly twice as many men as women consider the position of Women Rep as least important (40% vs. 23%), but this figure from women is also the highest (negative) proportion among the six positions.





Least Important

📕 Female 📕 Male

Female Male

Q. "Thinking about the positions you will vote for on Aug. 9 president, governor, senator, MP, women rep and MCA, which one do you consider to be the MOST IMPORTANT?" Q. Thinking about the positions you will vote for on Aug. 9 president, governor, senator, MP, women rep and MCA, which one do you consider to be the LEAST IMPORTANT?"




Section Three: The Presidential Contest

Preferred Next President/Running-Mate Pair

Kenyans' Preferred Next President by Total

With a small but significant proportion of respondents either claiming to still be undecided or declining to reveal their presidential candidate preference (8%), no candidate attains the required 50%+1 for an August 9 victory, though Odinga is close (at 49%). However, with those undisclosed-preference respondents removed, he does achieve this requirement (with 53%), with a clear margin ahead of his closed rival (Ruto, at 45%). Whether there will be enough 'balance' voter turnout across the country for these results to mirror the official results when the votes are counted, remains to be seen.



All Decided Voters Only

Base = all respondents

Base = all those declaring their voting intentions


Kenyans' Preferred Next President/Running-Mate by total, zone



As was the case with political parties and the two coalitions, support for (the main) presidential candidates is concentrated in their home areas, but quite divided elsewhere. The main contrast being that whereas ODM was dominant in six zones, the Odinga-Karua ticket leads in seven, evidently a reflection of the fact that their coalition is comprised of more than twice as many political parties as their competitors' (26 vs. 11).

Presidential Candidates	Total	Central Rift	Coast	Lower Eastern	Mt Kenya	Nairobi	Northern	Nyanza	South Rift	Western
Odinga–Karua	49%	19%	67%	64%	25%	55%	55%	75%	51%	61%
Ruto-Gachagua	41%	75%	20%	28%	62%	33%	39%	15%	45%	27%
Wajakoyah–Wamae	2%	1%	3%	1%	2%	3%	0%	2%	2%	1%
Waihiga–Mutua	0%	1%	0%	0%	0%	1%	0%	0%	0%	0%
	A0/	3%	F 9/	F9/	70/	29/	29/	4%	10/	69/
Undecided	4%	5%	5%	5%	7%	2%	3%	4%	1%	<mark>6%</mark>
Will not vote	1%	1%	1%	1%	1%	4%	0%	0%	1%	1%
No response	3%	2%	4%	2%	3%	2%	3%	3%	1%	4%

Over the past twenty-three months, the presidential contest trend has shown some notable changes, with Ruto largely dominating from mid-2020 for nearly the next two years, with Odinga only overtaking him in May (just after each had announced their running-mates). Once their positions reversed, however, it took until just the last two weeks or so for Odinga to increase the margin that TIFA's May survey revealed. Whether he can maintain – or even increase – it, remains to be seen.









Section Four: Confidence in IEBC

Confidence in IEBC by total, supporters of the main presidential candidates



With the election only days away, substantially more Kenyan have "a lot of confidence" in the IEBC compared to those who have "no confidence at all" (58% vs. 10%), and when each of two categories of "a lot" and "some" are combined they represent significantly more Kenyans than those who have "no" plus "only a little" confidence (74% vs. 19%). However, there is rather less confidence on the Odinga-Karua than the Ruto-Gachagua side of the election divide in terms of these combinations (for the positive one: 69% vs. 82%). Whether recent efforts by the IEBC to calm anxieties especially on the Azimio side will help to reduce this contrast is unclear.





Q. How much confidence do you have in the IEBC to conduct an honest and credible election? Do you have...?


Base = all respondents



Section Five: Level of Concern with Possible Election Violence

Level of Concern with Violence: Pre-Election Period by total & supporters of main presidential candidates


Few Kenyans appear worried about any serious violence during the remaining days to the election, though slightly more of Odinga-Karua supporters express such anxiety ("somewhat" + "very concerned": 19% vs. 13%).



Q. "How concerned are you that there will be any violence in your area during the days between now and Aug. 9? Are you…?"

Level of Concern with Violence: Pre-Election Period by total & zone


In regional terms, confidence in the absence of violence between now and August 9 is highest in Mt. Kenya, South Rift and Central Rift, and lowest in Northern and Nairobi, but the overall variation is quite modest (between 87% and 69%)



Q. "How concerned are you that there will be any violence in your area during the days between now and Aug. 9? Are you…?"

Level of Concern with Violence: Election Day by total & supporters of main presidential candidates


Nearly the same low level of concern is seen with regard to violence-expectations on voting day itself. That is, Ruto-Gachagua supporters are slightly more confident that election day will be devoid of violence (84% vs. 76%).



Q. How concerned are you that there will be any violence in your area on election day? Are you...? Are you...?


Level of Concern with Violence: Election Day by Total & Zone

In regional terms, the variation in concern over possible election day violence ranges from the highest level of expectations of its absence in Mt. Kenya and the lowest in Nairobi (87% vs. 66%).



Level of Concern with Violence: After Announcement of Results by total & supporters of main presidential candidates


For all Kenyans, including supporters of the main presidential contenders, there is most anxiety about election day violence, though even in this case a clear majority have "no concern at all" about it (66%), though again, with somewhat more confidence among Ruto-Gachagua supporters (72% vs. 62%).



Q. How concerned are you that there will be any violence in your area after the results are announced? Are you...? Are you...?

Level of Concern with Violence: After Announcement of Results by total & supporters of main presidential candidates

Across the country, one again Nairobians are less confidence about security, with one-quarter of them "very concerned" about election day violence (24%). This figure contrasts especially with those of residents of South Rift and Mt. Kenya (7% and 10%, respectively). Clearly, residents of the capital are influenced by their history in this regard.




Q. How concerned are you that there will be any violence in your area on election day? Are you...? Are you...?

Expectation of Change in Life If Preferred Candidate Wins by total, zone, supporters of the main presidential candidates



Overall, about two-thirds expect that their lives will improve within just one year if their preferred presidential candidate (and runningmate) enters State House (69%) Slightly more of those supporting the presidential candidates (as compared with those who remain 'undecided' or did not reveal their voting intentions) holding this view (nearly three-quarters(+), with one exception: the supporters of Wajakoyah-Wamae (only 54%). Whether this is because the very fact of being attracted to a rather unconventional candidate itself reflects their lack of hope in the future (perhaps combined with the fact that they realize he has no chance of winning) is unclear.



Q. "If your preferred presidential candidate wins the election, how certain are you that your life will be much any better after one year compared to what it is now? Are you...?" SNGLE RESPONSE – READ OUT



Section Six: Concluding remarks

Concluding Comments



□ With just over a week remaining until the Aug. 9 election, absent some dramatic event(s), it is unlikely that the figures obtained in this survey regarding the presidential contest would change very much – though taking into account the normal margin-of-error (just over +/-2%). Yet, as been seen recently in several other countries – including those with much longer and 'deeper' history of election-related polls than in Kenya, it may still be the case that the official (even if completely 'verified and credible') results do not match those obtained in this survey.



- □ Two factors could potentially cause this: (1) differential voter turnout in the respective candidates' 'strongholds', and (2) some degree of 'lying' by respondents in the interviews. Regarding the latter, it can be asked: which candidate's supports might be less willing to reveal their true voting intentions, either by claiming to be 'undecided', or even by saying they intend to vote for the other candidate? While late-period polls associated with Kenya's last several elections did not produce such 'deviations', the current situation with the retiring president overtly support his deputy's chief rival, and someone they both strained hard to defeat in the last two elections is quite unprecedented. As such, these results can IN NO WAY be said to 'predict' the presidential election's outcome.
- At the same time, it appears that a second round, run-off, contest is rather less likely than it seemed a few weeks ago when the third most popular candidate was twice as popular as he is now (4% vs. 2%).

Concluding Comments (con't)





- It is also impossible to determine the impact of motivation-effect of 'down-ballot' contests on either such voter turnout or the beneficiaries in the presidential contest. Such impact is suggested by the findings in this survey related to the perceived importance of the various/six elective positions that will be filled on August 9, where the focus on the presidency is substantially less than it is in terms of media attention. To what extent could that factor impact the presidential contest itself? Only post-election research could answer that question, but is clear from the data that devolution has made its mark, not just in terms of resource-allocation and development, but on national-level electoral politics as well.
- In this regard, the data suggest that both Senators and Women Reps, in particular, could do more to explain the importance of their positions to the public.
- □ Finally, while the survey reveals a fairly high level of confidence in the IEBC both nationally and across the political divide, as well as a rather low level of violence-expectations at any of the three remaining elements of the electoral cycle, such views in no way guarantee 'happy-endings' with regard to either. These outcomes depend largely on the performance of the institutions responsible, as well as on Kenyans themselves.




Section Seven: Methodology & Demographics

Methodology Overview



Fieldwork Date	31st July to 1st August 2022
Geographical	 Nationally Representative Sample (spread across 9 Zones ; Central Rift, Coast, Lower Eastern, Mt Kenya, Nairobi, Northern, Nyanza, South Rift, Western
Data collection	 Telephonic Interviews conducted (with respondents whose contacts were collected through face-to-face (i.e., household-based interviews) Interviews were conducted in (mainly) Swahili and English. Data collection was conducted over just two days, reflecting TIFA's capacity for outward bound calls, experienced callers and the relatively short questionnaire
Sample	2,268 respondents
Margin of error	+/- 2.058 % (Note: Larger error-margins for sub-samples)
Funding	TIFA Research

Demographics: Region, Gender, Age, Education & Setting



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Sampling Zones Classification

County	Region
Uasin Gishu	Central Rift
Elgeyo-Marakwet	Central Rift
Nandi	Central Rift
Baringo	Central Rift
Nakuru	Central Rift
Kericho	Central Rift
Bomet	Central Rift
Mombasa	Coast
Kwale	Coast
Kilifi	Coast
Tana River	Coast
Lamu	Coast
Taita-Taveta	Coast
Kitui	Lower Eastern
Machakos	Lower Eastern
Makueni	Lower Eastern

County	Region
Trans Nzoia	Western
Kakamega	Western
Vihiga	Western
Bungoma	Western
Busia	Western
Garissa	Northern
Wajir	Northern
Mandera	Northern
Marsabit	Northern
Isiolo	Northern
Turkana	Northern
West Pokot	Northern
Samburu	Northern

Nairobi Nairobi

County	Region
Meru	Mt Kenya
Tharaka-Nithi	Mt Kenya
Embu	Mt Kenya
Nyandarua	Mt Kenya
Nyeri	Mt Kenya
Kirinyaga	Mt Kenya
Murang'a	Mt Kenya
Kiambu	Mt Kenya
Laikipia	Mt Kenya
Siaya	Nyanza
Kisumu	Nyanza
Homa Bay	Nyanza
Migori	Nyanza
Kisii	Nyanza
Nyamira	Nyanza
Narok	South Rift
Kajiado	South Rift

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