



State of Kenyan Politics

Bipartisan Talks and Political Alignment

21st September 2023

Section One: Summary Findings

Section Two : Evolving Political Alignments

- Political party, political coalitions, Jubilee Party leadership

Section Three: Current Political Issues

-Support for bipartisan talks, likelihoods of success, support for prime cabinet secretary position , official leader of the opposition

Section Four: Methodology & Demographics



Section One: Summary Findings

Perceived Legal Secretary General of Jubilee Party



32%

Jeremiah Kioni



21%

Kanini Kega



47%

**Neither/Not Sure/
No Response**

Source: June 2023 Survey

Q. Who do you think is the legal Secretary-General of Jubilee is, Kanini Kega or Jeremiah Kioni?

Political Alignment

Political Party Support

UDA	35%
ODM	16%
Jubilee	2%
Wiper	3%
Other	6%
Undecided/NR	38%

Political Coalition Support

Kenya Kwanza	36%
Azimio La Umoja	28%
Undecided/NR	35%

General Political Alignment

Pro-government	39%
Pro-opposition	22%
None	39%

Source: June 2023 Survey

Kenya Kwanza and Azimio La Umoja Talks



Support for Kenya Kwanza & Azimio La Umoja Talks

- 48%** strongly support
- 16%** somewhat support
- 4%** somewhat oppose
- 19%** strongly oppose
- 13%** neither oppose/support

Q. How much do you support the Kenya Kwanza and Azimio reconciliation talks?

Source: September 2023 Survey



Success likelihood of Kenya Kwanza & Azimio La Umoja Talks

- 48%** Certain/Very Likely
- 20%** Possible but not certain
- 21%** Very unlikely but not certain
- 11%** Not sure/No response

Q. How likely do you think it is that these reconciliation talks will succeed so that there is enough agreement on the issues discussed so that there will be no further Opposition demonstrations and protests?

Source: September Survey



Likelihood that Kenya Kwanza will deliver promises if it reaches agreement with Azimio

- 46%** more likely
- 38%** less likely
- 16%** not sure/nor response

Q. Do you think the Ruto Govt will be more or less likely to fulfill its campaign promises if it reaches agreement with Azimio/the Opposition during the reconciliation talks that are now taking place?

Support for the Leader of the Official Opposition and Prime Cabinet Secretary



Support for the Official Leader of the Opposition Position

- 45%** strongly support
- 17%** somewhat support
- 5%** somewhat oppose
- 21%** strongly oppose
- 13%** neither oppose/support

Impact of Raila's acceptance of Official Leader of the Opposition Position

- 36%** make the opposition stronger
- 48%** make the opposition weaker
- 16%** makes no difference



Support for the Office of the Prime Cabinet Secretary

- 27%** strongly support
- 15%** somewhat support
- 7%** somewhat oppose
- 31%** strongly oppose
- 20%** neither oppose/support

Source: September 2023 Survey

Section Two : Evolving Political Alignments

- a) Introductory comments
- b) Changes in political party and coalition support
- c) Current tussle over control of Jubilee Party
- d) Opposition MPs co-operating with Kenya Kwanza
- e) Concluding remarks



Section 2a): Introductory Comments



- ❑ This Release contains data obtained from the national survey conducted by TIFA Research during 24th to 30th June, 2023. The survey, comprised of 1,530 respondents, used CATI (Computer-Assisted-Telephonic-Interviews). The emphasis of the 1st Release (of 4 July) was on the economic situation (or perhaps, the 'plight') of Kenyans, in terms of a number of key demographics, including employment status, monthly income, the ability to save, and the source of consumables. It also reported Kenyans' awareness of recent price changes of basic commodities, and their views about the positive and negative aspects of the new budget, including the housing levy. The 2nd Release (of 13 July) included findings on Kenya's perceived direction as well as the main achievements and failures of the Ruto/Kenya Kwanza government so far, with a particular focus on the Finance Act that was set to take effect on 1 July.
- ❑ In this Release the focus is on politics. In particular, it tracks changes in political party and coalition support since well before last year's election including even since TIFA's previous survey in March of this year. Further, it captures views regarding the current tussle over control of Jubilee, as well as Kenyans' views about those Jubilee MPs who have been 'co-operating' (in varying degrees) with the Kenya Kwanza government (including attending a Kenya Kwanza parliamentary group meeting at State House in May).



- With specific regard to the presentation of data, TIFA has (where relevant, again) used political alignment, defined here as pro-Government and pro-Opposition. To produce this dichotomy, two criteria were used: which (if any) political party is supported, and the same for either of the two coalitions (Kenya Kwanza, Azimio la Umoja). However, regarding the former, since Jubilee is split – with its leadership being legally contested – respondents expressing support for this political party are divided between those who say they recognize Kanini Kega as its Secretary-General (and are thus deemed to be pro-Government) and those who recognize Jeremiah Kioni (and are thus deemed to be pro-Opposition). That is, even if Jubilee's overall support is quite modest, it is useful for purposes of correlations to place as many respondents as possible into either of these two political alignment categories for purposes of some data analysis, especially to measure the level of political polarization at the time of the survey over several of the issues that were investigated.

IN REPORTING THE JUNE 2023 RESULTS, IT IS ADVISABLE TO EMPHASIZE THAT AS THE SURVEY FROM WHICH THEY ARE DERIVED WAS CONDUCTED DURING THE LAST WEEK OF JUNE, AS SUCH, THEY DO NOT CAPTURE ANY EVENTS OR OPINIONS THAT MAY HAVE TAKEN PLACE OR EVOLVED SINCE.

THESE INCLUDE: THE BUDGET WHICH CAME INTO EFFECT ON 1 JULY, THE SUBSEQUENT PROTEST-DEMONSTRATIONS, EFFORTS OF UDA TO CONVINC SEVERAL OF ITS KEY OTHER COALITION MEMBERS TO DISSOLVE THEIR POLITICAL PARTIES AND JOIN UDA, THE (ATTEMPTED) OUSTER OF SEVERAL MPS FROM ODM FOR THEIR 'DISLOYALTY' TO THE PARTY BY ASSOCIATING THEMSELVES WITH THE KENYA KWANZA GOVERNMENT, AMONG OTHER RELEVANT DEVELOPMENTS.




Section 2b): Political Alignment

- Political Party Alignment – June vs September 2023
- Political Party Alignment – by region
- Coalition Alignment – Current and Trend
- General Political Alignment

Political Party Alignment

By total: June vs September 2023



- ☐ UDA remains the dominant political party, its level of popularity being nearly twice that of the Opposition's ODM. All others combined attract less than half of that of ODM.
- ☐ However, a substantial proportion decline to identify with any party either by claiming to be "undecided" or more emphatically declaring they support "none", or simply not answering the question at all.
- ☐ This figure stands in sharp contrast to the much smaller figure obtained in TIFA's last pre-2022 election survey (12%) when the level of partisan political engagement was (obviously) higher.

Q. "Which political party, if any, do you identify with most at the national level?" **SINGLE RESPONSE – DO NOT READ**

Source: June vs September 2023 Survey Base = all respondents

National Level Political Parties by zone



□ Across the country, UDA is strongest in Central Rift and Mt. Kenya, a clear reflection of last year's election results in those areas. Further, the results from Northern are perhaps more significant, just in late July last year TIFA found that ODM and Jubilee combined were far more popular than was UDA (51% vs. 31%), yet now UDA is twice as popular as ODM there, with Jubilee's support minimal. As for ODM, aside from Nyanza and South Rift, in the other four zones where it remains the most popular party, UDA is 'nipping at its heels'.

Political Party	Total	Central Rift	Coast	Lower Eastern	Mt Kenya	Nairobi	Northern	Nyanza	South Rift	Western
UDA	34%	48%	21%	16%	45%	27%	45%	18%	27%	31%
ODM	18%	12%	23%	16%	6%	20%	19%	40%	17%	19%
Wiper	2%	1%	1%	18%	1%	2%	0%	1%	0%	0%
Jubilee	3%	2%	1%	1%	6%	2%	3%	2%	3%	1%
KANU	1%	0%	1%	0%	1%	0%	1%	0%	0%	2%
Roots Party	1%	1%	0%	0%	0%	1%	2%	1%	0%	1%
ANC/FORD-K	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	2%/3%
PAA	0%	0%	2%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Other	1%	0%	2%	3%	1%	0%	3%	3%	0%	0%
Undecided	14%	14%	16%	11%	14%	16%	14%	9%	20%	19%
None	6%	4%	7%	4%	8%	10%	3%	4%	10%	5%
No Response	20%	16%	26%	31%	18%	23%	12%	21%	23%	17%


Q. "Which political party, if any, do you identify with most at the national level?" **SINGLE RESPONSE – DO NOT READ**

Political Party Alignment: Trend Analysis

Trend Analysis: June 2021 – September 2023



Over the last two years there have been several major shifts in the distribution of political party support, the most notable being the rise of UDA and the erratic rise and fall of those either undecided or declining to identify with any party. However, most recently – since March – it is the decline of support for both UDA and ODM (from 45% to 34% for the former and from 29% to 18% for the latter), and the dramatic increase in the proportion of those unaligned (from 14% to 40%).



Q: "What political party do you support most or feel closest, if any?" **SINGLE RESPONSE**


Source: September 2023 Survey

Political Coalition Support

Trend Analysis: June 2022 – June 2023



- ❑ The same pattern of the decline of support for both the ruling and main Opposition parties is evident with regard to two main coalitions, though with Kenya Kwanza losing even more support for the last three months than did Azimio la Umoja (from 49% to 35% = 14%), as compared to Azimio la Umoja (from 40% to 28% = 12%).
- ❑ Likewise, these declines are reflected in the substantial increase in the proportion expressing support for neither coalition, nearly tripling since March (from 13% to 36%).



Q. "Which political grouping or coalition do you feel closest to or support?" **SINGLE RESPONSE – DO NOT READ**


Base = all respondents

General Political Alignment

by total



- ❑ Based on expressed political party support including that for the two national coalitions, it was (once again) possible to profile the entire sample in terms of all respondents' basic political alignment, using the three categories of: Pro-Government, Pro-Opposition, and None.
- ❑ Although enjoying robust majorities in both branches of the national legislature, fewer than half of all Kenyans indicate their support for the Kenya Kwanza government (39%), a figure equal to those who decline to identify with any political party or coalition. On the other, the Opposition currently attracts fewer than a quarter of all Kenyans (22%), though whether these figures will remain constant as the Government begins its second year in power remains to be seen.



Section 2c): Other Political Party Issues


- ❑ Other Political Party Supported (Mainly for Local Contests)
- ❑ Most Popular Local Level Parties by Supporters of the Main National Parties
- ❑ Local Level Political Alignment of Those Who Support No National Party
- ❑ Nation Political Orientation of Jubilee Supporters
- ❑ Views on Political Alignment of Elected Jubilee Leaders
- ❑ Views on Contested Jubilee Leadership

Proportion Who Support Another Political Party Mainly For Local Contests

by total, zone



- While only a modest minority of Kenyans express support for another, mainly local-level, political party (17%), this is most common in Lower Eastern, evidently a reflection of the fact that the most popular local party, Wiper, did not field a presidential candidate last year, with all three governors and senators from Ukambani elected on Wiper tickets, and its leader, Kalonzo Musyoka, continuing to play a leading role in the Azimio la Umoja coalition. Roughly this same level of ‘pluralism’ is evident in Northern and Nyanza.
- By contrast, Central and South Rift zones are the most monolithic in partisan terms, even if Narok County has a UDA governor and an ODM Senator, while the reverse is true in Kajiado County.
- (Note: Only 3% of those who self-identified with any party at the national level named a local one that they support.)



Q: “And is there another political party you also support, perhaps just in your area, mainly for candidates aside from the presidential ones?”

Supporters of Another Political Party Mainly for Local Contests/ Supporters of Jubilee as Another Political Party


by total, political alignment




While a minority, more of those aligned with the Opposition also support another party than do those aligned with Government (26% vs. 18%). Other things being equal (which is rarely the case!), this fact may give the ruling coalition somewhat more internal political coherence than the Opposition (even aside from the fact that having power greatly increases the resources available to distribute and thus maintain loyalty/control).

Almost identical minorities on each side of the main political divide also support Jubilee (13% among those who are Pro-Government vs. 15% among those pro-Opposition). This fact may help to at least partly explain the intensity of the still-unresolved legal contest for 'ownership' of this (former ruling) party

Supporters of Another Political Party



Supporters of Jubilee as Another Political Party



Q: "And is there another political party you also support, perhaps just in your area, mainly for candidates aside from the presidential ones?" **SINGLE RESPONSE**


Q Which party is that?"

4 Most Popular Other Political Parties Supported by Supporters of UDA/ODM/Wiper by the 17% who say they also support another party




While only a modest minority of Kenyans express support for a second political party “mainly for local electoral contests”, those who do so among the three most popular parties (UDA, ODM, Wiper) mention a large number of them. Limiting them to the top four of such supported other parties, UDA supporters most often cite ODM and Jubilee (24% and 22%, with more such respondents residing in Northern and Nairobi than the other seven TIFA zones), while those of ODM most often cite Wiper, UDA and Jubilee (32%, 23%, and 18%). Among Wiper supporters, the other party supported most by far is ODM (71%), although in this case it was obviously for the national/presidential contest rather than for any local ones, given the strong support to Azimio’s presidential campaign by Wiper leader Kalonzo Musyoka, even if he was not Odinga’s running-mate in 2022 as he had been in the two previous elections.


UDA Supporters



ODM Supporters



Wiper Supporters




Q: “And is there another political party you also support, perhaps just in your area, mainly for candidates aside from the presidential ones?”
 Q: “Which party is that?”
 Source: June 2023 Survey

Views on the Contested Leadership of Jubilee

by total, political alignment



□ The leadership of Jubilee remains unclear, with challenges moving between the Registrar of Political Parties, and Political Parties Disputes Tribunal and the Courts. As such, it is unsurprising that both among all Kenyans and across the political divide there is a clear lack of consensus about this issue. At the same time, clear pluralities are evident among Government and Opposition supporters for the competing leaderships aligned to their respective parties/coalitions. Specifically, while overall, only one-fifth (21%) consider K. Kega the Jubilee Secretary-General, twice as many Government as Opposition supporters do so (31% vs. 15%). Likewise, while rather more Kenyans J. Kioni as the party's legitimate S-G (32%), is margin among Opposition supporters is clear (47% vs. 28%). At the same time, nearly half of those whose level of interest/involvement in politics is minimal in that they support no political party or coalition are uncertain as to who Jubilee's S-G is (44%: or should be – as the response to this question could be as much one of preference as of fact; the same applies to those who would not even answer the question at all: 19%).



Q. "Who do you think is the legal Secretary-General of Jubilee is, Kanini Kega or Jeremiah Kioni?"

Source: June 2023 Survey


Views on Whether Jubilee MPs Supporting Kenya Kwanza Should Resign

by total, political alignment (among those who are pro-Government and recognize K. Kega/are pro-Opposition vs. recognize J. Kioni as Jubilee Secretary-General)



□ To see the extent to which supporters of the Government/Opposition are 'in line' with the leadership of their respective political formations, their responses to a question about whether elected Jubilee officials (among whom are 29 in the National Assembly and 5 in the Senate) but who now support the Kenya Kwanza government were correlated with those who support each one and who recognize Kanini Kega or Jeremiah Kioni, respectively, as the legal/legitimate Secretary-General of Jubilee. Doing so reveals that while more pro-Government respondents think they should stay put in Jubilee (50% vs. 38%), more pro-Opposition supporters want them to re-contest their seats on another party after resigning from the party. As seen, however, these contrasts are rather modest, suggesting that the split over this issue among the opposing political leaders is considerably more 'toxic' than it is among their respective followers. How the actual constituents of these (around 30) Jubilee 'deviants' feel about their de facto defection to Kenya Kwanza goes beyond the data captured in this survey.

- They should resign from the party and re-contest their seats on UDA or another Kenya Kwanza-affiliated party.
- They should just remain in Jubilee.
- No Opinion



Q. "Thinking about those leaders elected as Jubilee candidates who are now supporting the Ruto government, which of the following is closest to your own view?" **READ OUT**



Section 2d): Concluding Comments

Concluding Comments

Several points can be made with regard to several of the findings reported above:

- ❑ The first is that while UDA remains the most popular political party, its support level as of late June had declined (by 11%, from 45% to 34% since TIFA's March survey). Yet the same has occurred with ODM, with its support-level declining since March by the same amount (from 29% to 18%). By contrast, the proportion of Kenyans who now support no party (or who refused to answer the question at all) has nearly tripled (from 14% to 40%), indicating a massive drop in public confidence in the two main parties that stand on opposite sides of the nation's political divide. In other words, "none"/"undecided"/"no response" is now (or at least was, at the end of June) the second most popular 'party', and almost as popular as the UDA, the ruling party.
- ❑ Almost the same situation applies to the coalitions, with support for both of them dropping by almost equal amounts since TIFA's March survey (Kenya Kwanza: from 49% to 35%, and Azimio la Umoja, from 40% to 28%). And likewise, once again, there has been a major increase in the proportion of Kenyans who express support for neither coalition over this same period (from just 13% to 36%).
- ❑ In sum here, given the very troubled state of the economy – whatever the mixture of causes involving both external/foreign and internal/domestic factors – there may be cause for concern when the proportions of those expressing support for none of the major political entities or neither of the main coalitions have reached such levels, though such a situation may likewise encourage new political actors/configurations to come forward in order to tap into such apparent despondency, though how likely such a development is remains to be seen.



Concluding Comments (con't)

- ❑ Another finding is that nearly one-in-five Kenyans express support for (at least) two political parties: one national, and one (mainly) local. This underscores the increasing reality of the need to build election coalitions that take into account regional/communal interests. Moreover, the fact that many supporters of the main contesting national level parties express support for the same such (mainly) local level parties underscores the declining salience of clear policy contrasts (let alone ideology) in terms of the partisan 'menu' that voters must peruse as elections approach.
- ❑ With specific regard to Jubilee – even though it now enjoys but a shadow of its former behemoth/ruling party status – its support base is clearly split in terms of those expressing alignment with this party at both the national and (mainly) local level (even if nearly all of its 34 elected national legislative members have expressed open support for the Ruto-led Kenya Kwanza government and as such have helped to pass a number of controversial bills in both the National Assembly and the Senate). Such a division must be considered in the context of the on-going legal battle for its control. Of most recent relevance here are first, the ruling on 13 June by the Political Parties Disputes Tribunal upholding the decision of the Registrar of Political Parties that had ceded control of the party to the Kenya Kwanza Kanini Kega/Sabina Chege; the High Court issuance of “conservatory orders” on 13 July halting the implementation of that ruling, effectively reinstating the Jeremiah Kioni/David Murathe leadership of the party – a ruling that the High Court affirmed on 9 August and that will obtain until the case can be fully heard and determined (the first inter-parties hearing of which was set for 13 September).



Concluding Comments (con't)

- ❑ For this TIFA survey, the focus on the party's future was aimed not just as gauging its popularity, but also the level of awareness of and opinion about its contestation, in part to judge the degree to which it mirrors respondents' coalition alignments. As shown, while pluralities of the supporters of both sides of the political divide recognize their respective (and legally adversarial) leadership-factions of the party (31% among those pro-Government and 47% among those pro-Opposition), the figures are far from overwhelming, evidently reflecting the genuine uncertainty about the ultimate resolution of this issue and/or the low level of grass-roots mobilization over this issue, itself perhaps in part a reflection of the calendar-distance to the next election.
- ❑ Almost the same degree of contrast is seen with regard to views on the position of elected Jubilee officials who have recently aligned themselves with the Kenya Kwanza government. Specifically, rather more Kenyans who are pro-Opposition want them to resign their seats and re-contest them on their current de facto party of choice (UDA) as opposed to those who are pro-Government (59% vs. 38%, respectively). That this issue goes beyond being simply one of public opinion is seen in the controversies over the control of parliament as well as access to allocations from the Political Parties Fund, among other issues, which also include at least the perception of independence of several key institutions, namely: the Registrar of Political Parties, the Political Parties Disputes Tribunal, and the Judiciary. In the meantime, an ODM "disciplinary committee" recommended the expulsion of five of its own MPs – a decision that was ratified by its Party Leader, Raila Odinga – but which itself has now been taken on appeal to the Political Parties Disputes Tribunal. Whatever the outcome, it will have a significant impact not just for ODM but also for the regulation of political parties more generally.
- ❑ Altogether, and moving forward, it will be important to see whether the basic distribution of results reported here are basically fluid and fleeting, or a more permanent political 'constellation' within Kenya's societal 'universe' for some time to come.





Section Three: Current Political Issues

- a) Introductory Comments
- b) Bipartisan Talks
- c) Support for the Two Proposed New Positions
- d) Concluding Remarks



- ❑ In recognition of the completion of President William Ruto's first year in office, TIFA conducted a survey just before the anniversary of his inauguration on 13 September of last year. It was done using CATI (Computer-Assisted-Telephonic-Interviews) with 1,007 respondents. The questions covered in the 1st Release focused on Kenyans' current economic conditions as well as their awareness of Kenya Kwanza's main campaign promises, including their views as to the extent of the implementation of these promises so far and their expectations about the such implementation by the time of the next election in 2027.
- ❑ This 2nd Release reports findings related to various current political issues. Some certain of these issues were covered in both of TIFA's previous surveys (in March and June) findings from all three will be compared.
- ❑ Of note, however, it was only one day after this anniversary that the Energy Regulatory Commission announced substantial increases in the price of all petroleum products that took place immediately, increases that were bound to increase the cost-of-living more generally. However much (if any) impact such a development would have had on any of results included here can only be surmised, though are likely to be captured in TIFA's next national survey.
- ❑ Regarding the presentation of these results, TIFA has (where relevant) used political alignment, defined here as pro-Government and pro-Opposition. To produce this dichotomy, two (if largely overlapping) criteria were used: which (if any) political party is supported, and the same for either of the two coalitions (Kenya Kwanza or Azimio la Umoja).

Section 3a): National Dialogue Talks

- Support for the National Dialogue Talks
- Perceived Likelihood of Success of National Dialogue Talks
- Expected Impact of Potentially Successful National Dialogue Talks on the Ability of Kenya Kwanza to Fulfill Its Main Campaign Promises


Kenyans' Level of Support for the National Dialogue Talks

by total, political alignment



Only about half of Kenyans give strong support to the current National Dialogue talks, with nearly one-in-five strongly opposed to them. However, such support is slightly higher among Opposition supporters as compared with those of the Kenya Kwanza government (53% vs. 48%). How similar is the actual desired content of what might emerge from such talks across the political divide is another matter altogether.

■ Support Strongly ■ Support Somewhat ■ Oppose Somewhat ■ Strongly Oppose ■ Neither Support nor Oppose/No Opinion



Q: "How much do you support the Kenya Kwanza and Azimio reconciliation talks?" SINGLE RESPONSE – READ OUT

Source: September 2023 Survey


Perceived Likelihood of Success of National Dialogue Talks So As To Prevent More Demonstrations/Protests

by total, political alignment



□ A clear plurality of Kenyans across the political divide are optimistic about the outcome of the current National Dialogue talks, at least in terms of obviating the Opposition’s intentions to organize more protest-demonstrations, even if these proportion do not constitute clear majorities (i.e., above 50%)..

■ Certain/Very Likely ■ Possible but Uncertain ■ Very Unlikely/Impossible ■ Not Sure ■ NR




Q: “How likely do you think it is that these reconciliation talks will succeed so that there is enough agreement on the issues discussed so that there will be no further Opposition demonstrations and protests? Do you think this outcome is...?” SINGLE RESPONSE – READ OUT

National Dialogue Talks Correlations: Likelihood of Success X Level of Support by those who strongly support/oppose the talks & by those who view success as certain/very likely vs. very unlikely/impossible



□ Taking the most strongly held views regarding support for the National Dialogue talks and their perceived likelihood of success, it is clear that optimism regarding both has a strong, if not overwhelming, impact on views about the other. Specifically, those who strongly support the talks are markedly more optimistic about their chances for success as are those who strongly oppose them (62% vs. 10%). Likewise, many more of those who believe the talks are certain or very likely to succeed also support the strongly, whereas only a small minority of those who view them as having minimal or no chances of success are among their strong supporters (62% vs. 22%).



Q: "How much do you support the Kenya Kwanza and Azimio reconciliation talks?"

Q: "How likely do you think it is that these reconciliation talks will succeed (and) there will be no further Opposition demonstrations and protests?" SINGLE RESPONSE – READ OUT


Source: September 2023 Survey

Perceived Potential Impact of Successful National Dialogue Talks on the Ability of the Kenya Kwanza Government to Fulfill its Campaign Promises

by total, political alignment



Only a slight plurality of Kenyans believe that a successful outcome of the current National Dialogue talks will enable the Kenya Kwanza government to fulfill its most important campaign promises (46%), with a majority either considering such an outcome less likely or are not sure about this. Moreover, the views about this across the political divide are minimal.



Q: "Do you think the Ruto/Kenya Kwanza government will be more or less likely to fulfill its campaign promises if it reaches agreement with Azimio/the Opposition during the reconciliation talks that are now taking place?" SINGLE RESPONSE – READ OUT

Source: September 2023 Survey



Section 3b): Two Proposed Constitutional Offices


- Prime Cabinet Secretary
- Leader of the Official Opposition

Opinions Regarding the Proposed Establishment of Office of Prime Cabinet Secretary

by total, political alignment



☐ Nationally, there is a near-even split regarding the creation of the position of Prime Cabinet Secretary (42% supporting it either strongly or somewhat, vs. 40% who oppose it at these two levels). However, apparently because it is now occupied by a senior Kenya Kwanza figure, there are clear pluralities for its support among Pro-Government Kenyans and opposition to it from those who are Pro-Opposition (39% and 45%, respectively; there is also more opposition to it among those who are non-aligned).



Q: "Do you support or oppose the establishment of the Office of the Prime Cabinet Secretary?" SINGLE RESPONSE – READ OUT


Source: September 2023 Survey

Opinions Regarding the Proposed Establishment of Office of Leader of the Official Opposition

by total, political alignment



Both among all Kenyans and across the political divide, there is more positive than negative opinion about the creation of the position of Leader of the Official Opposition, even if it far from unanimous. Notable here is the only marginal contrast of these views between Government and Opposition supporters, with almost the same proportion of both either strongly or somewhat supporting this proposal (67% among the former vs. 70% among the latter).



Q: "Do you support or oppose the establishment of the Office of the Leader of the Official Opposition?" SINGLE RESPONSE – READ OUT


Source: September 2023 Survey

Perceived Impact on the Strength of the Opposition If the Position of Leader of the Opposition in the National Assembly is Created and Azimio Accept It

by Total, Political Coalition Alignment – March 2023



- Among all Kenyans and among supporters of both coalitions, more believe the creation of this Official Leader of the Opposition position would make the Opposition weaker, assuming Raila Odinga would agree to occupy it (and if he would not, would any other Opposition leader do so?).



Q: "If this new position of the Official Leader of the Opposition is created and Raila Odinga accepts it, do you think it will make the Opposition as a whole...?"

Source: September 2023 Survey



Section 3c): Concluding Comments

Concluding Comments

Several points can be made with regard to the findings included in this 2nd/final Release of TIFA's September, 2023 survey:

- ❑ The first is that both UDA as the 'first-among-equals' in the Kenya Kwanza coalition – and this coalition itself – remain considerably more popular than its ODM and Azimio la Umoja rivals, with minimal change in such popularity since TIFA's late June survey.

- ❑ Second, clear if modest majorities across the political divide express support for the National Dialogue talks now underway, even if at the time of the survey (and yet currently) the Technical Teams engaged by each side have yet to produce a clear/agreed agenda as to which issues will constitute the subsequent discussions (though they have announced they will make use of some 142 submissions from the public in their effort to do this). Meanwhile, at the end of August Raila Odinga recently threatened a resumption of protest-demonstrations if the talks fail. Whatever the case, while the results of this survey also indicate considerable optimism that the talks will eventually produce success (as defined here, so that the Opposition sees no need for further protest-demonstrations), there is much less optimism as to whether any such 'success' will enhance the Kenya Kwanza government's ability (or commitment) to fulfill its main campaign promises, with both Government and Opposition supporters almost equally divided about this, though with slightly more among both believing that it will do so. (The data also reveal a considerable level of 'wish-fulfillment' in that those who support the talks are considerably more positive about their chances of such success.



Concluding Comments (con't)

- ❑ Finally, regarding the proposed creation of two additional constitutional positions – that of Prime Cabinet Secretary (currently occupied de facto by Musalia Mudavadi) and Leader of the Official Opposition – there is considerably more support for the latter than the former across the political divide, even if in the case of the latter it fails to constitute a clear majority. Also striking here is the fact the (higher) level of support for the position of official Opposition leader is quite similar across the political divide, this is not the case regarding the position of Prime Cabinet Secretary, for which clear pluralities of Government and Opposition supporters express opposing opinions on this (the former being in favor and the latter against). To some extent, at least, such polarization may reflect the fact that the current occupant of the former position is – as noted – a fervent political ally of the President.
- ❑ Finally, in connection with the proposed creation of the latter position, it may be useful to refer to the findings TIFA obtained in its March, 2023 survey (as shown in the next Slide), which revealed that there was considerably agreement across the political divide that the creation of this position would make the Opposition weaker rather than stronger (even if the margins between these two contrary views were narrow). As such, TIFA may find it useful to include this question in its next (or some subsequent) survey, assuming that this proposal actually emerges from these National Dialogue talks.





Section Four: Methodology & Demographics

Methodology Overview: June Survey



Fieldwork Dates	24 th - 30 th June 2023
Geographical	Nationally Representative Sample (spread across 9 Zones): Central Rift, Coast, Lower Eastern, Mt Kenya, Nairobi, Northern, Nyanza, South Rift, Western
Data collection	<ul style="list-style-type: none">▪ Telephonic Interviews conducted (with respondents whose contacts were collected through previous face-to-face (i.e., household-based interviews)▪ Interviews conducted in Swahili (mainly) and English
Sample	1,530 respondents
Margin-of-error	+/- 2.5 % (Note: Larger error-margins for sub-samples)

Methodology Overview: September Survey




Fieldwork Date	8 th - 10 th September 2023
Geographical	Nationally Representative Sample (spread across 9 Zones): <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Central Rift, Coast, Lower Eastern, Mt Kenya, Nairobi, Northern, Nyanza, South Rift, Western
Data collection	<ul style="list-style-type: none">▪ Telephonic Interviews conducted (with respondents whose contacts were collected through previous face-to-face (i.e., household-based interviews)▪ The interviews conducted in Swahili (mainly) and English.
Sample	1,007 respondents
Margin-of-error	+/- 3.1 % (Note: Larger error-margins for sub-samples)


Demographics:

Region, Gender, Age, Religion, Setting & Marital Status


Zone




Setting




Gender



Age



Highest education level





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