



Kenya's Road to 2027 General Election

Political Parties, Presidential Contest and Coalition Dynamics

June 2026 Survey | First Release

Date of Release: 24th July 2026



Introductory Comments

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Concluding Comments

Survey Methodology

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Introductory Comments




- ❑ This is the 1st of several survey Releases based on TIFA's second national survey of 2026, conducted from 13th to 22nd June 2026. The results are based on household, face-to-face interviews with 2,048 randomly selected Kenyan adults (aged 18 and above) across all 47 counties. As described in the concluding Methodology & Demographics section, we believe the sample accurately reflects the country's adult population.
- ❑ The focus of this Release is the current political environment as well as several issues related to next year's general election. As was done in several previous Releases of TIFA surveys, certain of these results are correlated with views about the 'Broad-Based Government' (BBG). Doing this at least partly answers the question as to the underlying bases for the contrasting views about the data presented, while suggesting the degree of political polarization in the country, at least in terms of the issues covered.
- ❑ In considering these results, however, it is important to acknowledge that various events occurred both during the period of data collection and after that may have impacted public views such that were the identical questions to be asked in a similar survey today, somewhat different results might emerge. Still, the results presented here constitute an accurate picture of Kenyans' views on the subjects covered at the time they were collected,

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Summary Findings

Political Party Support


Kenya's Political Landscape is Becoming More Competitive



- ❑ Support for ODM and UDA has declined significantly since the 2022 General Election, while DCP is emerging as a challenger and nearly one-third of voters remain undecided.


Preferred 2027 Presidential Election Winner

Ruto maintains a lead as opposition support is dispersed across multiple candidates



- Although opposition support remains fragmented, Sifuna has recorded the fastest rise among opposition figures, increasing from virtually no support in 2025 to 15% in June 2026, positioning him among the leading opposition contenders.


Preferred 2027 Presidential Election Winner by supporters of the main political parties



- ❑ **ODM supporters:** most of them back Sifuna, while 20% would support Ruto and 13% remain undecided.
- ❑ **UDA Supporters:** Ruto has strong support from the UDA base
- ❑ **UDA, Wiper and Jubilee supporters:** exhibit stronger party cohesion, with large majorities supporting their respective candidates.

'Linda Ground' vs. 'Linda Mwananchi' Support

ODM Supporters Consolidate Behind Linda Mwananchi'



Base = ODM Supporters

- ❑ ODM supporters are consolidating behind the 'Linda Mwananchi' position, with support increasing while the alternative 'Linda Ground' position continues to lose ground.

Gachagua's Most Viable Path to Defeating Ruto

Anti-Ruto voters prioritise unity over personalities



Gachagua is allowed (by the court) to contest & become the main opposition candidate

14%

He is allowed (by the court) to contest, **but supports another opposition** candidate

33%

He is **NOT** allowed to contest, so he supports another Opposition candidate

29%

No such outcome: Ruto cannot be defeated

5%

Not sure

19%

62%

Base = those who oppose Ruto's re-election

- ❑ Nearly two-thirds (62%) believe Gachagua should support the strongest opposition candidate, compared with just 14% who want him to lead the opposition ticket.
- ❑ The findings indicate that anti-Ruto voters are primarily focused on maximizing the opposition's chances of victory, regardless of who heads the coalition.

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Detailed Findings

Section One: Correlation Variable – the Broad-Based Government

❑ Views on the 'Broad-Based' Government

Opinion Regarding the Broad-Based Government (BBG): Comment



- ❑ It is now over a year since TIFA began to track the popularity of the so-called 'Broad-Based Government' (BBG) arrangement between President William Ruto and the former (and the late) Prime Minister Raila Odinga that was launched in the wake of the Gen-Z protests of June 2024. As the relevant survey results have shown, it has engendered increasing disquiet among their respective core support-bases, and especially within ODM. This stems largely from the fact that as next year's election approaches, the party will have to decide whether it was only a short-term measure to shore up the Kenya Kwanza government's legitimacy by first agreeing on and then implementing a 'Ten-Point Agenda' of reforms, or (mainly) a longer-term arrangement that will involve first, supporting Ruto's re-election, and then, a more formal power-sharing agreement, should he win a second term.
- ❑ In particular, the split that this arrangement has caused within ODM has continued to widen, with Raila's elder brother Oburu recently calling for its dissident 'Linda Mwananchi' faction to leave the party, an option that its leaders, including especially Nairobi senator Edwin Sifuna, Siaya governor James Orengo and Vihiga senator Godfrey Osotsi, have themselves begun to hint at of late (and with former DP Rigathi Gachagua declaring that they would be "most welcome" to join his DCP. Such a potential exit from the party is also likely to have been further encouraged by the replacement of Sifuna as the Senate's deputy Minority Whip, being replaced by a vocal BBG supporter. At the same time, the 'mainstream' ODM leadership have been increasingly insistent that the DP slot on the UDA ticket be allocated to them, a demand that cannot sit easily with supporters/associates of the current holder of this position, Prof. Kithure Kindiki. Altogether, the eventual status of the BBG remains uncertain, whether or not ODM can hold together.


Opinion Regarding the Broad-Based Government (BBG): Comment



- ❑ More uncertainties about the contours of next year's election in general and the BBG in particular are related to the yet-to-be finalized legal challenge that Gachagua has made to his impeachment and removal from office.
- ❑ Whatever the ultimate outcome, and as was done in TIFA's four previous surveys, views about the BBG are presented not just for the general population but also for certain sub-sections of the sample, as well as for using correlation analyses to help reveal the underlying bases for opinions (and realities) regarding various issues, even as the country's highly fluid political landscape.



Opinion of the 'Broad-Based Government' by total



- Among all Kenyans, nearly twice as many express opposition to the BBG as compared to those who say they support it (52% vs. 30%), with the remainder either having no opinion (15%) or revealing that they are not aware of this de facto coalition between UDA and ODM (4%).


Base = All respondents

Opinion of the 'Broad-Based Government'

by total : May 2025 – June 2026



□ TIFA's last five surveys reveal that aside from May and August of last year, support for the BBG among all Kenyans has remained just below one-third, with support at the time of the former less than one-quarter (22%) and at the time of the latter nearly half (44%). The current level of support is identical to what it was in May (30%), suggesting that the continuing split within ODM over the matter of supporting the President's re-election bid (and related matters) has appeared to have created a fairly stable 'ceiling' as to how much support the BBG can attract.



Base = All respondents


Q: "If you have an opinion, do you support or oppose the 'Broad-Based Government' based on cooperation between President William Ruto and the late Prime Minister Raila Odinga?"

Support for the 'Broad-Based Government'

by total, zone: August 2025 – June 2026



Even taking into account the greater statistical error-margins for these sub-samples (zones), some fluctuations in support for the BBG are evident in such regional terms. While it has increased recently in Central Rift, Coast and Lower Eastern (by 15%, 5%, and 11 %, respectively), it has declined in Northern, Nyanza and Mt. Kenya (by 15%, 14%, and 4%, respectively). At the same time, in all zones aside from Coast, levels of support for the BBG are substantially lower than they were in November of last year, the largest gap being in Western (off 33%: currently 29% as compared with 62% then), followed by Nyanza (of 24%: currently 35% as compared with 59% then).



% Saying They Support It

Section Two: Political Alignment

- ☐ Political Party Alignment
- ☐ Party Membership Levels
- ☐ Party Non-Supporters: Main Reason
- ☐ The ODM Split: Linda Mwananchi vs. Linda Ground

Political Party Alignment

by total, zone



- In regional terms, the concentration of support of all the main parties reflects the home areas of party leaders, aside from UDA, which is most popular in Northern. Leading in this regard is ODM, which attracts support from nearly half of Nyanza (47%), followed closely by Wiper in Lower Eastern (45%) and UDA in Central Rift (43%).. At the same time, the fact that more than one-quarter decline to self-identify with any political party (28%) suggests the limited relevance of such entities to many Kenyans, even with little more than a year to the next general election.


Political Party	Total	Central Rift	Coast	Lower Eastern	Mt Kenya	Nairobi	Northern	Nyanza	South Rift	Western
ODM	20%	7%	35%	4%	9%	22%	19%	47%	17%	22%
UDA	17%	43%	12%	10%	4%	7%	48%	8%	11%	9%
DCP	12%	6%	5%	10%	35%	12%	4%	1%	18%	3%
Jubilee	10%	6%	8%	1%	9%	13%	6%	22%	11%	7%
Wiper	7%	0%	4%	45%	5%	13%	3%	1%	5%	2%
DAP-K	1%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	1%	0%	0%	3%
Other	5%	5%	8%	4%	2%	5%	4%	4%	4%	7%
None	28%	32%	29%	20%	32%	28%	15%	13%	32%	44%
NR	2%	2%	1%	4%	2%	1%	1%	3%	1%	3%

Q: "Which political party (or alliance), if any, do you feel closest to or support?" SINGLE RESPONSE

Base = All respondents

Political Party Alignment: August (2025) – June (2026)

by total




Over the last 10 months the distribution of support for political parties has been quite stable, with these few exceptions: (1) a slight decline in that for DCP (from 16% to 12% since May 2026); (2) a slight increase in ODM's popularity as compared to UDA (3% vs. 1%); (3) a slight increase of those who support no party since last May (4%) though at level still far below what it was in May of last year (28% vs. 41%).

Declared Members of the Political Party They Support *by those who support (the five largest) political parties*



- Among all those who support any political party nearly half (44%) claim to be actual members. Among the five main/most popular parties, UDA has the highest proportion of supporters who claim membership (59%), followed by ODM (45%), while DCP (new newest party) has the fewest (34%). Whether such formal membership will increase as next year's election approaches remains to be seen. (Note that TIFA did not enquire as to why those who had become members had done so.)




Main Reason For Not Supporting Any Political Party

by those who say they do not support any party



- There are various reasons why those who express support for no political party take such a position. The most frequently given (29%) is a lack of interest in politics in general and elections in particular. Such an attitude is somewhat similar to the third most frequent response: a belief that “all parties are corrupt/useless”, and thus “don’t care about people like me” (19%). Rather more engaged are those with the second most frequent response (22%): the need to know who the parties’ candidates in next year’s election will be, starting with those for president. Also more engaged are those who say that the party they previously supported “changed its policies/leaders”, evidently in a way disappointing to these previous supporters. Finally, a substantial proportion failed to give a clear reason (20%) or simply failed to answer the question (2%).




Q: "What is the main reason that you do not support any political party?"

Support-Split Within ODM: 'Linda Ground' vs. 'Linda Mwananchi'

by total, zone



□ Among all supporters of ODM, three-quarters (74%) declare support for the Linda Mwananchi grouping. Across the country, in no zone is support for the 'officially in-charge' rival (and BBG-aligned) Linda Ground (or 'Tuko Tayari') faction. Such support for the latter group runs from 0% in Lower Eastern (where the Opposition Wiper party holds sway) to 40% in Nyanza (especially in Luo Nyanza from which the main beneficiaries of the BBG come). (Note, however, that the base numbers in several of these zones are small, the statistical error-margins are correspondingly high.)



Section Two: Election Preparation


- ☐ Declared Registered Voters
- ☐ Main Reason for Not Being a Registered Voter

Declared Registered Voters

by total, zone



- Just over four-fifths of all Kenyans (83%) reporting to be registered voters, there is a considerable range in regional terms, from a high in Nyanza (89%) to a low in South Rift (66%). However, based on past (official) results, voter registration is never a precise indicator of actual voter turnout. Further (and not shown in the chart below), there is a marked contrast in terms of age, with far fewer in the under-35 age group declaring to be registered voters as compared with those 35 and above (72% vs. 96%). Finally (and likewise not shown in the chart below), there is no statistical contrast between supporters and opponents of the BBG in this regard (84% vs. 86%).




Base = All respondents

Main Reason for Not Being a Registered Voter

by total, youngest/oldest cohort (among those declaring that they are not registered voters)



- Among Kenyans not registered as voters, a number of reasons were cited, the most frequent being a lack of the required documents (37%), lacking sufficient time for the process and lacking an interest in voting/politics (22% for both).
- In further exploring the distribution of main reason for not being a registered voter, several major contrasts emerge when the youngest and oldest cohorts of the sample are compared. Most apparent is the proportion of those among the former who report not having an ID: nearly five times more than do those in the oldest cohort (50% vs. 11%).



Section Three: 2027 Election Issues

- ☐ Preferred 2027 Presidential Election Winner
- ☐ Preferred Option for Rigathi Gachagua to Take Regarding Presidential Contest
- ☐ Perceived Most Viable Opposition Challenger to President Ruto

Preferred 2027 Presidential Election Winner

by total, zone



- While President Ruto is currently the most popular potential (in his case, the only certain) presidential candidate (as of now), his standing at only one-quarter of Kenyans (24%) – though not necessarily registered, let alone likely, voters – suggests that the Opposition has considerable opportunity in next year's election. Yet the distribution of support for his main (potential) opponents shows how limited each of their support is outside their own areas. Consequently, if a "single" such candidate is named, it is unclear how much of the support now associated with the other Opposition leaders would end up in his 'vote-basket'. And this is in addition to the question as to whether one of them – Gachagua – will be allowed to contest at all, even as a DP running-mate, depending on the outcome of his on-going legal case challenging his 2024 impeachment.

Likely/ Possible Candidate	Total	Central Rift	Coast	Lower Eastern	Mt Kenya	Nairobi	Northern	Nyanza	South Rift	Western
William Ruto	24%	49%	21%	15%	8%	6%	61%	30%	11%	14%
Edwin Sifuna	15%	9%	27%	4%	9%	22%	9%	15%	13%	28%
Fred Matiang'i	14%	7%	9%	4%	18%	17%	6%	29%	16%	12%
Kalonzo Musyoka	13%	2%	10%	58%	14%	23%	3%	1%	13%	3%
Rigathi Gachagua	7%	4%	4%	4%	19%	8%	4%	2%	13%	1%
Babu Owino	2%	1%	2%	0%	0%	1%	4%	5%	2%	1%
Other	2%	2%	2%	0%	3%	1%	0%	5%	5%	4%
Undecided	20%	24%	24%	9%	25%	21%	11%	8%	22%	31%
NR	3%	3%	1%	4%	3%	2%	2%	4%	5%	6%

Base: All respondents

Preferred 2027 Presidential Election Winner

by registered vs. not registered voters



- ❑ Comparing 2027 presidential choices of those who claim to be registered voters and those who do not shows that both Ruto and Kalonzo score higher among the former (Ruto by 4%: 24% vs. 20%, and Kalonzo by 3%: 13% vs. 10%). On the other hand, rather more of those not registered report they are so far undecided on this issue 24% vs. 19%), which is logical, given that more of those who remain unregistered have less motivation to decide who their preferred winner is, unless/until they get registered then on or before election day have to make up their minds.




Base = 1,704 / 344

Preferred 2027 Presidential Election Winner

by total: November (2025), May (2026) June (2026)



Starting with TIFA's first survey following Raila's passing, while President Ruto's position has been quite stable, though that of Kalonzo has declined significantly (from 25% in November to 13% currently). By contrast, Sifuna's rating has jumped by 50% since May (from 10% to 15%). Other changes to note are the decline in Babu's rating since last November (from 8% to 2%), presumably due to his supporters switching to Sifuna (from 8% to 2%) as well as a slight decline in support for Gachagua, perhaps a consequence of his failure to have his impeachment-removal as DP overturned in the High Court (even if he has said he would appeal).



Base = All respondents


Q: "Whether or not you have ever voted or intend to vote in the future, whom would you like to win the 2027 presidential election?" SINGLE RESPONSE – DO NOT READ

Preferred 2027 Presidential Election Winner

by supporters of the main political parties




- An analysis of the distribution of (actual/potential) presidential candidate support among supporters of the main political parties reveals strong preferences for a particular individual in each one. This is particularly so for ODM, UDA, and Jubilee with regard to Kalonzo, Ruto, and Matiang'i, respectively (90%, 84% and 73%). Rather lower levels of support are expressed for Sifuna among ODM supporters and Gachagua among those of DCP (44% for both), but this is logical given that the former has expressed no interest in contesting for this position, and the latter's eligibility remains in doubt due to his impeachment two years ago (even if his judicial appeal remains to be finalized concluded).



Best Option for Gachagua to Take to Maximize Chances of Defeating Ruto by those who prefer that President Ruto is defeated in his 2027 re-election bid



- Among those who are opposed to Ruto's re-election next year, there is a very even split in opinion as to what position former DP Gachagua should take, given also the uncertainty of the outcome of his legal challenge to his impeachment-removal as DP and thus his very eligibility to contest. Specifically, about the same proportion believe this result is most likely if he is allowed to contest but instead back someone else as to those who feel this outcome is most likely to occur if he backs someone else even if he is not allowed to contest (33% vs. 29%). By contrast, far fewer think Ruto could be defeated by Gachagua himself – again assuming he is allowed to contest (14%). Far fewer (of those who do not support Ruto's re-election) believe he is unbeatable, whatever Gachagua does (5%).




Base = (those who oppose Ruto's re-election) 1,558

Q: "Which of the following outcomes regarding the recent failure of former Deputy President to win his impeachment case in the High Court do you think will make it most possible for an Opposition candidate to defeat President Ruto in next year's election?" SINGLE RESPONSE – READ OUT

Potential Opposition Candidate Considered Most Likely to Defeat Ruto

by total, opinion of the BBG



The data above is not the person that Kenyans will vote for, but Kenyans' perception of the strength of the opposition candidates

- In responding to the question as to which Opposition leader would have the best chance of defeating President Ruto in next year's election, Kenyans are quite divided, with nearly equal proportions naming Edwin Sifuna, Fred Matiang'i and Kalonzo Musyoka (18%, 18% and 16%, respectively), closely followed by Rigathi Gachagua (14%) whose eligibility to contest remains in doubt.
- At the same time, there are some marked contrasts between supporters and opponents of the BBG on this subject. For example, nearly five times more of the former express the view that the President is unbeatable regardless of who his (main) opponent might be.

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Concluding Comments

Concluding Comments

- ❑ The results presented in this 1st Release of TIFA's June survey reveal that the steady increase in the popularity of the BBG among Kenyans has continued (since May) to attract the support of just under one-third of Kenyans, with its support below that of a minority in all nine zones used by TIFA to show regional variations.
- ❑ Regarding political party alignment, while ODM remains the most popular party (by a slim margin over UDA), a larger proportion of UDA supporters claim to be party members as well. Just what motivates certain people to become (and continue as) such members is unclear (as TIFA did not probe on this issue), but might be worth investigating in a future survey. In particular, how much is such membership more a consequence of party-outreach efforts and how much is a reflection of a self-driven motivation of citizens?
- ❑ On the other side of the coin, TIFA did ask for the main reason why the more than one-quarter of all respondents who do not support any party (as of now, at least) take this position. While a plurality professed to having "no interest" in politics/elections (with another substantial proportion of the view that "all parties are corrupt" and/or "don't care about people like me", others are waiting to know what candidates and manifestos the parties will offer ahead of next year's election. As such, it can be assumed that the proportion declining to support any party will decrease over the coming year.



Concluding Comments (con't)

- ❑ Directly related to that election, more than four-fifths of Kenyans claim to be registered as voters, though a vast disparity was found in terms of age, with almost twice as many among the oldest age-cohort (45 and above) stating they are registered as compared with those in the youngest (18-24). Further and as expected, the main reason for this lower proportion among the youngest cohort is the lack of a National ID (or other suitable document). As such, the IEBC, together with the National Registration Bureau, clearly has a challenge if the goal is to maximize participation in next year's election.
- ❑ With regard to the 2027 presidential contest, President Ruto once again leads, but with only about one-quarter of all Kenyans supporting him. Moreover, only in Northern does he attain an outright majority. But this lack of overall, national popularity is at least partly counter-balanced by the absence of any 'front-runner' on the Opposition side, with the vast majority of the support for each of them being highly concentrated in regional—ethnic terms. At the same time, whereas the vast majorities of the main political parties that have a potentially viable/announced presidential candidate (Wiper: Kalonzo, UDA: Ruto, and Jubilee: Matiang'i), the same does not apply to ODM and DCP where uncertainty abounds (though for different reasons) as to whether they will front such candidates. As such, only a survey conducted after a "single Opposition candidate" (and DP running-mate) is agreed upon (by whatever method – if indeed that can be achieved) will it be possible to at least gauge presidential electoral popularity. Such uncertainty is likewise reflected in Kenyans' views as to the perceived ability of the various potential Opposition candidates to deny the current incumbent a second term.



Concluding Comments (con't)

- ❑ Lastly, again with all such surveys, the results reflect a reality (within the survey's margin-or-error, as noted) at a particular point in time, and even if the results are released quickly, some of them may not precisely reflect such a reality, given that events that may affect them continue to occur (such as the Ol Kalou by-election that was conducted several weeks after the interviews for this survey were concluded). Whatever these challenges, however, TIFA will endeavor to track the findings presented here (among others) as the country moves towards the next general election.

- ❑ **Note: TIFA welcomes requests for additional interpretation of these results by those intending to make use of them by contacting either or both of those identified in the final slide of this Presentation.**



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Methodology & Demographics






Methodology Overview



Fieldwork Dates	▪ 13th to 22nd June 2026
Zone Categories	Nationally Representative Sample (spread across 9 Zones ; ▪ Central Rift, Coast, Lower Eastern, Mt Kenya, Nairobi, Northern, Nyanza, South Rift, Western
Data Collection	▪ Face-to-face (i.e., household-based interviews) ▪ Interviews conducted in Swahili(mainly) and English
Sample Size	▪ 2,048 respondents
Margin-of-Error	▪ +/- 2.18 % (Note: Larger error-margins for sub-samples)
Funding	▪ TIFA Research

Demographics:

Region, Gender, Age, Education Level, Setting



Sampling Zones Classification



County	Region
Uasin Gishu	Central Rift
Elgeyo-Marakwet	Central Rift
Nandi	Central Rift
Baringo	Central Rift
Nakuru	Central Rift
Kericho	Central Rift
Bomet	Central Rift
Mombasa	Coast
Kwale	Coast
Kilifi	Coast
Tana River	Coast
Lamu	Coast
Taita-Taveta	Coast
Kitui	Lower Eastern
Machakos	Lower Eastern
Makueni	Lower Eastern

County	Region
Trans Nzoia	Western
Kakamega	Western
Vihiga	Western
Bungoma	Western
Busia	Western
Garissa	Northern
Wajir	Northern
Mandera	Northern
Marsabit	Northern
Isiolo	Northern
Turkana	Northern
West Pokot	Northern
Samburu	Northern
Nairobi	Nairobi

County	Region
Meru	Mt Kenya
Tharaka-Nithi	Mt Kenya
Embu	Mt Kenya
Nyandarua	Mt Kenya
Nyeri	Mt Kenya
Kirinyaga	Mt Kenya
Murang'a	Mt Kenya
Kiambu	Mt Kenya
Laikipia	Mt Kenya
Siaya	Nyanza
Kisumu	Nyanza
Homa Bay	Nyanza
Migori	Nyanza
Kisii	Nyanza
Nyamira	Nyanza
Narok	South Rift
Kajiado	South Rift

Contact Us

Dr Tom Wolf
tpwolf1944@gmail.com

Maggie Ireri
ask@tifaresearch.com