



TIFA National Survey: 1st Release

Current Political Alignments and 2027 Election Prospects

14th May 2026



Introductory Comments

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Introductory Comments




- ❑ This is the 1st of several survey Releases based on TIFA's first national survey of 2026,, conducted during 2nd-11th May. The results are based on household, face-to-face interviews with 2,013 randomly selected Kenyan adults (aged 18 and above) across all 47 counties. As described in the concluding Methodology & Demographics section, we believe that the sample is an accurate reflection of the country's adult population.
- ❑ As was done in several Releases of TIFA's 2025 surveys, certain of these results are correlated with views about the 'Broad-Based Government' (BBG). Doing this at least partly answers the question as to the underlying bases for the contrasting views about the data presented, while suggesting the degree of political polarization in the country, at least in terms of the issues covered.
- ❑ In considering these results, however, it is important to acknowledge that various events occurred both during the period of data collection and after that may have impacted public views such that were the identical questions to be asked in a similar survey today, somewhat different results might emerge. Still, the results presented here constitute an accurate picture of Kenyans' views on the subjects covered at the time they were collected,

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Summary Findings

Political Party Support


Declining Dominance of ODM and UDA as DCP Gains Ground



□ The findings suggest a significant decline in support for both ODM and UDA compared to their August 2022 levels, highlighting possible voter fatigue, shifting political loyalties, and growing uncertainty within the political landscape. At the same time, the emergence and steady growth of DCP — rising from 9% in September 2025 to 16% in May 2026.

Support-Split Within ODM: 'Linda Ground' vs. 'Linda Mwananchi'


ODM Supporters Strongly Back the 'Linda Mwananchi' Position'



- ODM supporters appear to favour a more independent, people centred opposition approach rather than closer cooperation with the government. The strong backing for the "Linda Mwananchi" faction suggests growing grassroots preference for leaders perceived as defending public interests and holding government accountable.

Preferred 2027 Presidential Election Winner

Ruto Leads in a Fragmented and Still-Fluid 2027 Presidential Race




Q: "Whether or not you have ever voted or intend to vote in the future, whom would you like to win the 2027 presidential election?" SINGLE RESPONSE – DO NOT READ

- The 2027 presidential race remains highly fluid, with no single candidate commanding dominant national support. While President William Ruto leads at 24%, the findings show growing competition from other opposition figures. The data also points to a fragmented opposition landscape, with support spread across multiple leaders rather than consolidating around a single challenger.

Preferred 2027 Presidential Election Winner


Ruto Consolidates Lead Amid a Fragmented Opposition Landscape



- The 2027 presidential race remains competitive but is becoming more defined, with President William Ruto currently holding the strongest individual position. The emergence of Edwin Sifuna and Rigathi Gachagua also points to a shifting political landscape.
- Meanwhile, the declining undecided vote suggests that voter preferences are beginning to crystallize, increasing the importance of coalition-building and voter consolidation ahead of 2027.

Preferred DP Running-Mate for President Ruto in 2027 Election

Kindiki Emerges as Clear Front-Runner for Ruto's 2027 Running Mate Choice



- Kindiki is viewed as the most politically acceptable deputy option. In contrast, ODM-associated leaders attract relatively limited support for the running mate position. The results point to strong voter preference for continuity and stability within Ruto's political camp heading into 2027.


Base = Ruto's supporters for president

Preferred Opposition Presidential Candidate-Pairs for the 2027 Election

Cautious Optimism on Opposition Unity—But Doubts Remain



By Respondents who Support Opposition Candidates




Note: the pairs were tested without indicating who would serve as President or Deputy President.

- Among Opposition candidate supporters, the combination of Kalonzo and Matiangi attracts slightly more support than that of Kalonzo and Sifuna (31% vs. 28%). How much influence public opinion will have in this selection process remains to be seen.

Base = Those who support opposition candidates

Preferred Opposition Presidential Candidate-Pairs for the 2027 Election



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Detailed Findings



Section One: Correlation Variable – the Broad-Based Government

- ❑ Views on the 'Broad-Based' Government & Reasons

Opinion Regarding the Broad-Based Government (BBG): Comment



- ❑ However popular the so-called 'Broad-Based Government' (BBG) arrangement between President William Ruto and the former – and now, the late – Prime Minister Raila Odinga has been, since TIFA's most recent survey in November of last year it has engendered increasing disquiet among their respective core support-bases, and especially within ODM. This stems largely from the fact that as next year's election approaches, the party will have to decide whether it was only a short-term measure to shore up the Kenya Kwanza government's legitimacy, and this support, in the wake of the massive June 2024 'Gen-Z' protests, or a longer-term arrangement that will involve more formal power-sharing post-election, should Ruto obtain a second term.
- ❑ In particular, while Raila's elder brother Oburu has been 'anointed' as ODM party leader and has professed continued support for the BBG, a dissident group, led by the party's Secretary-General Nairobi senator Edwin Sifuna, along with such party notables as Siaya governor James Orengo and Vihiga senator Godfrey Osotsi, have taken issue with both the process and substance of this leadership-transfer. In doing so, they boycotted a recent three-day party conference in Mombasa, continuing to cling that only a National Delegates' Conference could make such a decision about Raila's successor. But clearly, their main grievance is not just the continued partnership of ODM with UDA and its affiliated Kenya Kwanza parties in the BBG, but perhaps even more galling, the Oburu group's repeated calls for Ruto's re-election, with the President himself asserting (as he did during a recent 'development-tour' visit to Homa Bay county), that ODM and UDA would be "together" before and after that event, though just what form this partnership would take remains unclear.



Opinion Regarding the Broad-Based Government (BBG): Comment




- ❑ Moreover, even if Oburu himself at one point declared this arrangement would end if ODM is not allowed to provide a DP running-mate for Ruto in next year's election, several others have said that it will be terminated unless sufficient progress is made in implementing the "Ten-Point Agenda" that was agreed between Ruto and Odinga in March of last year, and about which heated disagreements have emerged as to how much of such progress has been achieved, and indeed, whether the Kenya Kwanza's commitment to it exists. In the meantime, the rival factions have held frequent public rallies, often castigating their ODM counterparts by name and making conflicting claims as to what Raila's 'real' intentions were in fostering this arrangement, including as to what position he would take on the forthcoming presidential election. Meanwhile, the President had engaged in numerous rally-tours himself, especially in areas considered ODM strong-holds, such as Western, Nyanza and Coast, to drum up further support for the BBG as it is. Altogether, the eventual status of the BBG remains uncertain, whether or not ODM can hold together.
- ❑ Another factor at work recently are the frequent and vehement attacks on the government by former (impeached and removed) deputy-president Rigathi Gachagua, issued on several occasions at which he and his associates (and at times, members of the public present as well) were the targets of violence, in several cases with the presence and (alleged) participation of the Police.
- ❑ Finally in terms of this Release, to depict such factors have affected key aspects of Kenya's political landscape, some of the results are presented together with those from several previous TIFA surveys so that trends are more easily discerned.

Opinion Regarding the Broad-Based Government (BBG): Comment



- ❑ More uncertainties about the contours of next year's election are the consequence of the yet-to-be finalized legal challenge that former DP Rigathi Gachagua has made to his impeachment and removal from office, with a recent High Court decision giving him some 'breathing space' in his efforts to have it overturned (even if he has made clear he seeks not reinstatement, but financial compensation, together with lifting of the ban prohibiting him from holding public office. In the meantime, he has been actively campaigning in various parts of the country – though especially in his home Mt. Kenya region -
- ❑ In the meantime, and as was done in TIFA's two previous surveys, views about the BBG are presented not just for the general population but also for certain sub-sections of the sample, as well as using correlation analyses to help reveal the underlying bases for opinions (and realities) regarding various issues, even as the country's political landscape is bound to reveal major changes given Raila's departure from the scene over which is exercised such a profound influence for some three decades.

Opinion of the 'Broad-Based Government' by total



- Among all Kenyans, nearly twice as many express opposition to the BBG as compared to those who say they support it (56% vs. 30%), with the remainder either having no opinion (5%) or revealing that they are not aware of this de facto coalition between UDA and ODM.


Base = All respondents

Opinion of the 'Broad-Based Government'

by total : May 2025 – May 2026



TIFA's last four surveys reveal that while support for the BBG is higher than it was a year ago, the increase in its support seen over the previous two surveys (from 22% to 29% and then 44%) has now dropped, nearly returning to its modest August 2025 level (30% vs. 29%). The proportion of those expressing opposition to it has conversely increased since TIFA's November survey (from 48% to 56%). At the same time, those expressing no opinion has increased since November (from 8% to 13%), though still considerably lower than it was a year ago (25%).




Base = All respondents

Support for the 'Broad-Based Government'

by total, zone: August 2025 – May 2026



While support for the BBG remains largely constant in Northern Kenya (where the BBG again finds its highest level of support (at 58%), its popularity has declined in all other zones aside from the Coast, where it has risen slightly since last November (from 23% to 26%), perhaps a reflection of the efforts of the 'Linda Ground' faction within ODM which includes several regional notables. Elsewhere, however, its support has decreased markedly over the past few months, especially in Western and the Central Rift (from 62% to 29% in the former zone and from 60% to 32% in the latter, President Ruto's 'backyard'). But its decrease in support in the South Rift (from 44% to 26%) and in Nyanza (from 59% to 49%) are also noteworthy, as is that in Lower Eastern (from 38% to 19%). As for Mt. Kenya, perhaps its low standing there in November (22%) largely explains its minimal popularity-loss since then (from 22% to 17%), given how low it was to begin with, though both of these figures are higher than was that for last August (just 11%).





Q: "If you have an opinion, do you support or oppose the 'Broad-Based Government' based on cooperation between President Ruto and the late former Prime Minister Raila Odinga?"

Top 3 Reasons for Supporting/Opposing the 'Broad-Based Government'

by those saying that they support it / by those saying they oppose it



- ❑ Among those who support the BBG, its perceived promotion of national stability, and thus unity – thereby reducing ethnic tensions (certainly a function of the BBG itself, as frequently articulated by the President and other BBG leaders) – is by far the most commonly cited cluster of reasons for such support (41%). Next most frequently mentioned is its contribution to regional and communal inclusivity (28%). quite similar to “stability” reason already mentioned. The third most frequently offered reason is that of better service delivery (22%).
- ❑ On the negative side, the assertion that certain leaders, not ordinary people, are its main beneficiaries receives most mentions (42%), while its undermining of oversight and this accountability (27% and 15%, respectively), are also frequent mentions.



Q: "What is the main reason you say so?" SINGLE RESPONSE – DO NOT READ




Section Two: Political Alignment

- Political Party Alignment
- Belief that Any Party That Genuinely Represents Kenyans
- Perceptions of Opposition Strength

Political Party Alignment: August (2025) – May (2026)

by total



- In statistical terms, ODM, UDA and DCP have nearly equal popularity (18%, 17% and 16%), given the survey's margin-of-error (of +/-2.18%), with Jubilee occupying the fourth position (11%). But DCP's standing is notable, given its substantial increase over the last eight months, especially since November (from 6% to 16%). At the same time, those expressing support for no party has continued to decline over this period (from 41% in August to 24% currently).
- (Note that for this survey expressing respondents were not given the option of expressing support for a coalition, based mainly on the divisions within ODM, as presented below).

Political Party Alignment

by total, zone



- In regional terms, the concentration of support of all the main parties reflects the home areas of party leaders, aside from UDA, which is most popular in Northern. Leading in this regard is Wiper, which attracts support from nearly two-thirds of Lower Eastern (62%). The same applies, if more modestly, to ODM's support in Nyanza (38%) and DCP's support in Mt. Kenya (39%). At the same time, the fact that one-quarter decline to self-identify with any political party (24%) suggests the limited relevance of such entities to many Kenyans, even with little more than a year to the next general election.


Party	Total		Central Rift	Coast	Lower Eastern	Mt Kenya	Nairobi	Northern	Nyanza	South Rift	Western
ODM	18%		7%	26%	7%	7%	23%	21%	38%	18%	20%
UDA	17%		31%	15%	10%	7%	9%	39%	9%	19%	20%
DCP	16%		20%	6%	14%	39%	11%	10%	2%	17%	2%
Jubilee	11%		10%	2%	1%	16%	16%	8%	20%	6%	6%
Wiper	8%		1%	7%	62%	6%	12%	2%	1%	3%	0%
DP	1%		0%	0%	1%	0%	1%	3%	1%	0%	2%
DAP-K	1%		0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	1%	0%	1%	2%
Other	4%		4%	1%	1%	1%	2%	1%	20	0%	4%
None	24%		24%	41%	4%	23%	24%	14%	20%	30%	39%
NR	1%		2%	0%	1%	1%	1%	1%	0%	6%	2%

Belief That Any Political Party Represents the Interests of Kenyans

by total, opinion of the BBG



Whereas only a quarter of Kenyans (24% in previous chart) decline to express support for any political party, nearly half hold the view that no party “honestly” represents/serves the interests of ordinary Kenyans. This is so even if the proportion who give credit to parties for performing this democratic function is rather higher among BBG supporters than among its opponents (57% vs. 36%), and with the proportion of those holding the contrary view nearly identical among its opponents and those not even aware of the BBG (52% vs. 53%).



Q: “Whether or not you support any political party, do you think there is any that honestly represents or works for the benefit of all Kenyans like you?”


Base = All respondents

Perceptions of Opposition Political Strength

by total, opinion of the BBG



Contrasts in views as to the current strength of the opposition are modest, with the proportion of supporters of the BBG having a negative view on this being only slightly larger than those with a similar view among the BBG's opponents (41% vs. 34%). However, when the figures for a “weak” opposition and those for “no clear opposition” are combined, across the main current political divide, only about one-third consider the opposition “strong” as it stands today, evidently a reflection of views about the nature of the BBG itself.






Section Two: Ethnic Community Leadership

- Acknowledgement of an Ethnic Community Leader

Acknowledgement of an Ethnic Community Leader: August (2025) – May (2026) *by total, main ethnic groups*

While many analysts/commentators appear to believe that most Kenyans are basically ‘pawns’ of their ethnic community leaders, for the three surveys in which TIFA have posed this question, just half acknowledge that their community has one (49%). However, some changes in such acknowledgement have occurred recently. In particular, while this reported level has increased especially among the Somali (from 39% last November to 51% currently) and for non-Kikuyu peoples of Mt. Kenya (from 25% to 44%). There has also been a slight increase among the Kalenjin (from 49% to 56%). Overall, it appears that having even a potential (and ‘serious’) presidential candidate fosters such a perception. Whether such ethnic-based community leadership – or the lack of it – contributes positively or negatively to the country’s social, economic and political stability and development is another matter altogether.




Identity of the Most Popular Ethnic Community Leader

by main ethnic groups, among those who say there is one



Based only on the responses of those who affirmed that their ethnic community has a leader, there is considerable variation in terms of how much agreement there is as to this individual's identity. Most unanimity is evident among the Kamba, with more than nine-tenths mentioning Kalonzo (93%). Majority agreement on these individuals' identity is also seen among the Kisii (Matiang'i at 83%), the Kalenjin (Ruto at 73%), and the Kikuyu (Gachagua at 70%). The factors that influence the emergence of such leaders within Kenya's various ethnic communities, as well as those result in some members of each community acknowledging the presence of such a leader as well as their identity are undoubtedly complex, and would require – to begin with – a more detailed analysis that can be included in this survey Release.



Q: "Who is that?" SINGLE RESPONSE – DO NOT READ

Base = 981 29



Section Three: 2027 Election Issues


- Expectation of Continued Unity of (a) the BBG and (b) ODM to the 2027 Election
- Support for 'Linda Ground' vs. 'Linda Mwananchi' Within of ODM
- Preferred Position of ODM on the 2027 Presidential Election by ODM Supporters
- Preferred 2027 Presidential Election Winner
- Preferred Ruto DP Running-Mate (by Ruto supporters)
- Preferred Opposition Presidential Candidate-Pairs
- Perceived Most Viable Opposition Challenger to President Ruto

Expected Likelihood of the BBG Remaining United Up to the 2027 Election

by total, attitudes toward the BBG



Among all Kenyans, a clear plurality (38%) perceive the continuation of the BBG up to next year's election to be "not likely at all", though among the BBG's supporters the expectation (or is rather, just hope?) is four times greater than it is among BBG opponents (31% vs. 8%). There are also plurality negative views regarding the BBG's longevity among who profess no opinion about it or who indicate they are unaware of it (45% and 36%, respectively – though having said they were not aware of the BBG, perhaps these respondents were just guessing!).




Base = All respondents

Expected Likelihood of the ODM Remaining United Up to the 2027 Election

by total, attitudes toward the BBG



As for ODM's perceived future unity prospects, more than one-third of all Kenyans (36%) consider it "not likely at all", though contrasting figures about this in comparing views of BBG supporters and opponents 20% vs. 45%, respectively). Still, even among BBG supporters fewer than one-third (29%) think it is "very likely" that the party will have overcome its current internal strife by the time of next year's election, a figure more than double that of BBG's opponents (12%).



Base = All respondents


Support-Split Within ODM: 'Linda Ground' vs. 'Linda Mwananchi'

by total, opinion of the BBG




Among all of those identifying ODM as the political party they support or feel “closest to”, nearly three-quarters (73%) declare support for the ‘rebel’ ‘Linda Mwananchi’ faction, led most vocally by the group associated with Nairobi senator Edwin Sifuna. However, those ODM supporters who likewise express support for the BBG are nearly equally split in their support for this group as opposed to that led by ‘acting’ ODM party leader, Oburu Odinga (51% vs. 47%). By contrast, those ODM supporters who say they oppose the BBG are nearly unanimous in their support for the Sifuna faction (90%).

■ "Linda Ground" led by Oburu Odinga and others. ■ Linda Mwananchi' led by Edwin Sifuna and others. ■ No Opinion



Preferred Position of ODM Regarding the 2027 Presidential Election

by ODM supporters



- A slim majority of ODM supporters (53%) support having an Opposition candidate to challenge President Ruto in next year's election, whether s/he is from ODM (32%) or from another Azimio/United Opposition party (21%). By contrast, only a small minority want their party to support Ruto's re-election, whether he contests on a UDA ticket (8%) or an ODM one (8%). However, more than one-quarter (28%) prefer that their party supports no one and leaves it to its members/followers to make up their own minds. In reality, it seems much will depend on the outcome of the current contest for control of the party between its two competing factions, 'Linda Mwananchi' and 'Linda Ground'.

Preferred 2027 Presidential Election Winner

by total, zone



While President Ruto is currently the most popular potential (in his case, the only certain) presidential candidate (as of now), his standing at only one-quarter of Kenyans (24%) – though not necessarily registered, let alone likely, voters – suggests that the Opposition has considerable opportunity in next year’s election. Yet the distribution of support for his main (potential) opponents shows how limited each of their support is outside their own areas. This suggests that if a “single” such candidate is named, it is unclear how many of the support now associated with the other Opposition leaders would end up in his ‘vote-basket’. And this is in addition to the question as to whether one of them – Gachagua – will be allowed to contest at all, even as a DP running-mate, depending on the outcome of his on-going legal case challenging his 2024 impeachment.

Potential Presidential Candidate	Total		Central Rift	Coast	Lower Eastern	Mt Kenya	Nairobi	Northern	Nyanza	South Rift	Western
William Ruto	24%		37%	18%	8%	9%	16%	48%	41%	25%	19%
Kalonzo Musyoka	19%		4%	30%	78%	23%	21%	9%	4%	19%	8%
Fred Matiang’i	14%		9%	4%	7%	15%	21%	8%	27%	17%	11%
Edwin Sifuna	10%		15%	21%	1%	6%	10%	5%	11%	11%	14%
Rigathi Gachagua	9%		6%	4%	5%	23%	9%	15%	1%	4%	3%
Babu Owino	2%		1%	2%	0%	1%	3%	3%	5%	2%	2%
Other	1%		2%	3%	0%	3%	2%	2%	2%	5%	8%
Undecided	15%		20%	18%	0%	17%	16%	7%	9%	9%	29%
NR	3%		6%	0%	1%	3%	3%	2%	1%	8%	7%

Base = All respondents


Q: “Q: “Whether or not you have ever voted or intend to vote in the future, whom would you like to win the 2027 presidential election?” SINGLE RESPONSE – DO NOT READ

Preferred 2027 Presidential Election Winner

by May, August, November (2025), May (2026)




Over the last year, there have been several major changes in the (potential) presidential candidate ratings. The most notable are, first, Raila's 'exit' from the scene, and second, the emergence of Sifuna as a new magnet of such electoral popularity (from nothing to 10%). In addition, however, there is the marked decline of Matiangi's rating since his return from the UK a year ago (from 32% to 24%), and since last November, a decline in Kalonzo's rating as well (from 29% to 14%). At the same time, there has been a considerable decline in those stating they are "undecided" (currently just 15%), while Ruto's popularity is now at its highest peak since TIFA began tracking such potential vote-popularity in May of last year. (up from the high-teens to 24%).



Base = All respondents

Preferred DP Running-Mate for President Ruto in 2027 Election


by those who support Ruto's re-election



- ❑ A clear majority of those declaring support for President Ruto's re-election bid (59%) identify current DP Prof. Kithure Kindiki as their preferred running-mate in next year's presidential contest.
- ❑ Others mentioned trail far behind, with Homa Bay governor Gladys Wanga being the next most frequently mentioned, but at only one-fifth the frequency of Kindiki (12%).

Perceived Opposition Candidate Most Likely to Defeat President Ruto in the 2027 Election

by total, opinion of the BBG



- Among all Kenyans, there is a clear lack of agreement as to which (potential) opposition candidate would have the best chance of defeating President Ruto in next year's election, with Matiang'i, Kalonzo and Gachagua nearly tied in this regard (18%, 18%, and 17%, respectively), and Sifuna (the 'newcomer') not far behind (10%).
- Between supporters and opponents of the BBG, however, some moderate contrasts are notable. In particular, while BBG supporters view Kalonzo as having the best such chance (18%), its opponents give Matiang'i the highest rating for this role (23%). On the other hand, those expressing no opinion about the BBG identified Sifuna as Ruto's most potent challenger (18%).
- At the same time, far more BBG supporters assert that there is no one who could defeat him (28%).


Base = All Respondents

Preferred Opposition Presidential Candidate-Pairs for the 2027 Election

by total, presidential candidate preferences (Ruto supporters, supporters of others, none)



□ In considering possible Opposition candidate pairs (whichever one is the presidential and deputy-presidential candidate) to contest next year's election against President Ruto, no clear combination stands out as the most preferred, though unsurprisingly, nearly a majority of those declaring support for Ruto's re-election (40%) say that no such pair appeals to them. However, among Opposition candidate supporters, the combination of Kalonzo and Matiang'i attracts slightly more support than that of Kalonzo and Sifuna (31% vs. 28%). How much an influence public opinion – expressed in whatever form – will have in this selection process remains to be seen.



Note: the pairs were tested without indicating who would serve as President or Deputy President.

Q: "Which of the following possible Opposition presidential tickets if any would you most likely support?" READ OUT

4

Concluding Comments

- ❑ The results presented in this 1st Release of TIFA's May survey reveal that the steady increase in the popularity of the BBG among Kenyans has stopped – at least temporarily – with a clear decline in the proportion of Kenyans supporting it as compared with the results of last November.
- ❑ While the economic factors influencing such opinions will be revealed in a subsequent Release, the current political situation is clearly one of considerable uncertainty. This is seen in both the rhetorical bargaining between ODM and the Kenya Kwanza government regarding especially the shape of the next government (assuming Ruto gains a second term) as well as whether there will be 'zoning in the fielding of down-ballot candidates (a position pushed especially by ODM that has also demanded that UDA not field competing candidates in its bastions), but also the major split within ODM itself. Indeed, several of its Linda Mwananchi faction leaders have threatened to leave the party should the BBG arrangement not be terminated ahead of next year's election, though on other occasions they have declared their determination to 'recapture' the party whenever the next National Delegates' Conference is held. In this regard, the fact that this TIFA survey revealed that a significant majority of ODM supporters are currently backing the Linda Mwananchi 'rebels' – and also indicate their aversion to giving Ruto a second term at the ballot box – may further such tensions within the party.
- ❑ In the background of such uncertainty are several more relating to the Opposition's position in next year's election, whatever happens with ODM. The first question is whether the 'United Opposition' will agree to fielding a single presidential candidate, and just how that choice will be made. (For example, Jubilee deputy party leader Matiang'I has insisted that it must be done "by a transparent, scientific method",⁴¹ rather than "some back-room deal.")



Concluding Comments (con't)

- ❑ As this survey Release has shown, even if the current incumbent's relatively low popularity suggests his electoral vulnerability, the absence of a clear front-runner among Opposition ranks may make such apparent vulnerability irrelevant. The next question is whether (or how many of) those not selected to challenge Ruto will remain steadfast in supporting their nominee-colleague.
- ❑ Such an issue relates to another finding presented in this Release: that of ethnic community leadership. The findings revealed that only about half of Kenyans acknowledge such a leader within their community, which raises the question as to how many such community members would follow the 'guidance of such a leader – if they have one – in terms of their vote-choices in 2027, especially if the acknowledgment of such a leader now is based largely on the hope that he will be a presidential candidate, a leadership-influence role that could largely dissipate if someone else is selected as the 'United Opposition' candidate.
- ❑ Undoubtedly, with more than a year still remaining before Kenyan voters make their choices, much can (and probably will) take place that could significantly change the political landscape as revealed by this 1st Release of TIFA's May survey. Future surveys should be able to track these changes as they occur, while at least attempting to suggest why they have, and what they may mean for Kenya's future.



Concluding Comments (con't)

- ❑ Finally, it will be important to explore what Kenyans think about both the process and outcomes of the 24 by-elections that were held on November 27, the first test for the newly installed team of IEBC commissioners. On the one hand, it is clear from previous research that many Kenyans prefer to 'be on the side of the winners', so that the BBG's general success is likely to attract additional support on that basis. On the other hand, especially if any of the legal challenges to these results succeed, and/or if the rather scathing reports by several NGOs about campaign violations, police laxity in preventing/reining in violence, and alleged IEBC 'collusion' with electoral malpractice, at least some Kenyans could become more hostile to those currently in power, even if some leaders from their communities are among those reaping the current benefits of incumbency. Time will tell.



Concluding Points:

- ❑ Any such survey presents challenges, one being a limit on the duration of individual interviews, given that respondents generally lack any advanced notice that their participation is sought, and many will likely have already made plans for their daily activities. As such, many topics deemed useful cannot be included, nor can there be potentially revealing follow-up questions to every response given, especially those about complex topics. As such, it is often frustrating for consumers of the data who would have liked more depth to many of the subjects covered.

Concluding Comments (con't)

- ❑ Lastly, again with all such surveys, the results reflect a reality (within the survey's margin-or-error, as noted) at a particular point in time, and even if the results are released quickly, some of them may not precisely reflect such a reality, given that events that may affect them continue to occur.. Whatever these challenges, however, TIFA will endeavor to track the findings presented here (among others) as the country moves into the second half of the current decade, and towards the next general election.
- ❑ **Note: TIFA welcomes requests for additional interpretation of these results by those intending to make use of them by contacting either or both of those identified in the final slide of this Presentation.**



5

Methodology & Demographics





Methodology Overview



Fieldwork Dates	<ul style="list-style-type: none">▪ 2nd to 11th May 2026
Zone Categories	<p>Nationally Representative Sample (spread across 9 Zones ;</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">▪ Central Rift, Coast, Lower Eastern, Mt Kenya, Nairobi, Northern, Nyanza, South Rift, Western
Data Collection	<ul style="list-style-type: none">▪ Face-to-face (i.e., household-based interviews)▪ Interviews conducted in Swahili(mainly) and English
Sample Size	<ul style="list-style-type: none">▪ 2,013 respondents
Margin-of-Error	<ul style="list-style-type: none">▪ +/- 2.18 % (Note: Larger error-margins for sub-samples)
Funding	<ul style="list-style-type: none">▪ TIFA Research

Demographics:

Region, Gender, Age, Education Level, Setting



Sampling Zones Classification



County	Region
Uasin Gishu	Central Rift
Elgeyo-Marakwet	Central Rift
Nandi	Central Rift
Baringo	Central Rift
Nakuru	Central Rift
Kericho	Central Rift
Bomet	Central Rift
Mombasa	Coast
Kwale	Coast
Kilifi	Coast
Tana River	Coast
Lamu	Coast
Taita-Taveta	Coast
Kitui	Lower Eastern
Machakos	Lower Eastern
Makueni	Lower Eastern

County	Region
Trans Nzoia	Western
Kakamega	Western
Vihiga	Western
Bungoma	Western
Busia	Western
Garissa	Northern
Wajir	Northern
Mandera	Northern
Marsabit	Northern
Isiolo	Northern
Turkana	Northern
West Pokot	Northern
Samburu	Northern
Nairobi	Nairobi

County	Region
Meru	Mt Kenya
Tharaka-Nithi	Mt Kenya
Embu	Mt Kenya
Nyandarua	Mt Kenya
Nyeri	Mt Kenya
Kirinyaga	Mt Kenya
Murang'a	Mt Kenya
Kiambu	Mt Kenya
Laikipia	Mt Kenya
Siaya	Nyanza
Kisumu	Nyanza
Homa Bay	Nyanza
Migori	Nyanza
Kisii	Nyanza
Nyamira	Nyanza
Narok	South Rift
Kajiado	South Rift

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